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Irreparable Harms: How the Devastating Effects of Oil 
Extraction in Nigeria Have Not Been Remedied by  
Nigerian Courts, the African Commission, or U.S. Courts 
James Donnelly-Saalfield* 
I. Introduction
The unowned timber margin slender 
Despoils for me the world I own1 
Having exhausted much of the natural resources of the developed 
world, transnational corporations have turned their attention toward 
extracting and exploiting the natural resources of the developing world.  In 
the process they often cause tremendous environmental destruction – 
carving out hillsides, poisoning rivers, streams and bays, and releasing toxic 
gases into the atmosphere – with virtual impunity, unchecked by local law, 
international law, or U.S. law.  One of the developing nations that has 
suffered, and continues to suffer, some of the greatest environmental 
destruction at the hands of transnational corporations is Nigeria. 
Corporations involved in oil exploitation in Nigeria such as Shell and 
Chevron are given virtual free reign by the Nigerian government to pollute 
the air, by flaring associated gas, and pollute the Niger River delta 
(hereinafter “Niger Delta” or “Delta”) by leaking and spilling oil.  The lives of
the Nigerian people have been devastated as a result.  This paper examines 
how and why the legal systems of Nigeria, the African Charter, and the 
United States have failed to redress the environmental destruction of these 
corporations in Nigeria and it argues that plaintiffs have a very slight chance 
of obtaining relief in U.S. courts if they allege transnational harm, 
particularly if they allege harm to U.S. interests. 
Section II examines the environmental degradation that Nigeria faces 
and the connection between this degradation and the human rights abuses 
perpetrated by the security forces of the oil corporations and the Nigerian 
military.  Section III examines the failure of Nigerian courts to enforce 
Nigerian environmental law and human rights norms.  It also examines the 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of California Hastings College of the 
Law, San Francisco, California. 
1. JOHAN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, FAUST 285 (Cyrus Hamlin ed., Walter
Arndt trans., W. W. Norton & Company 1976).
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failure of African Commission to enforce environmental norms contained in 
the African Charter.  Section IV examines how U.S. environmental law might 
be applied extraterritorially and argues that plaintiffs should assert harm to 
U.S. domestic interests in order to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.  Section V examines the Alien Tort Statute and argues 
plaintiffs have a very slim chance of obtaining relief under this statute if they 
allege transnational environmental harm. 
II. Oil Exploration and Exploitation in the Niger Delta
Located in West Africa, Nigeria has the largest population of any state 
in Africa and is comprised of about 200 different ethnic groups, 500 
indigenous languages, and two major religions, Islam and Christianity.2  This 
diversity is entirely a product of the process of 19th century colonization, in 
which Great Britain “carved Nigeria out of a complex mosaic of indigenous
political systems.”3 The British administered the heterogeneous nation
through indirect colonial rule, establishing regional systems of government 
that ruled through the local ethnic elites of the largest ethnic groups.4  This 
led to “a strongly regional and ethnic system of politics, in which local
regional ethnic elites worked on behalf of the colonial administration 
through systems of Native Administration.”5  The regional and ethic
divisions only intensified after Nigeria’s independence in 1960, with the 
nation fragmenting into smaller and smaller states so that certain ethnic 
communities might gain access to government revenues, the bulk of which 
came from oil extraction.6  The secession of the eastern region and 
proclamation of the independent Republic of Biafra in 1967, which included 
the Niger Delta, was largely motivated by a desire to control one of the most 
oil rich regions of the country.7  After three years of bloody civil war, the 
secessionists were defeated, the eastern region was reincorporated into the 
federation, and the nation began a thirty year period of almost 
uninterrupted military rule.8 
2. Bowoto v. Chevron, No. C 99-02506 SI, Doc. 1640, Order Re:
Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Claims 10 Through 
17, at 3 (N.D. Cal. August 14, 2007) (hereinafter Bowoto) (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). 
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 4.
8. Id.
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During the period of military rule Nigeria became increasingly 
dependent on oil revenues, with over 90 percent of its export income since 
1973 generated by the sale of oil.9  In 2000 Nigeria received 99.6 percent of 
its income from oil, making it the most oil dependent country in the world.10  
As of 2004, oil accounted for 98 percent of Nigerian exports, 87 percent of 
government revenues, and almost half of gross domestic product.11  During 
that year oil corporations operating in the Delta received vast daily 
revenues, with Shell receiving about $50 million per day, ExxonMobil $69 
million, ChevronTexaco $36 million, TotalFinaElf $31 million, and Agip $15 
million.12 
Despite the enormous amount of oil pumped out of the Niger Delta 
(“the Delta”) and the enormous amount of wealth it has generated, the
region remains one of the most underdeveloped in the world.13  The World 
Bank estimates that 80 percent of the oil revenue is accounted for by only 1 
percent of the Nigerian population and that nearly three quarters of 
Nigerians live on about $1 per day.14  Only 30 percent of the inhabitants of 
the Delta have access to potable water and life expectancy in the Delta is 
around 40 years.15  Unemployment rates are also generally very high in the 
Delta, in many areas as high as 90 to 95 percent.16 
Within the Delta, Rivers State produced nearly 60 percent of the 
country’s oil in the 1970’s but received only 2 percent of the country’s oil 
revenue in 1982, an amount that was reduced even further under subsequent 
military regimes.17  The homeland of the Ogoni people, known as Ogoniland, 
is located within Rivers State, has fifty-six oil wells that account for almost 
15 percent of Nigerian oil production, and has generated an estimated $30 
billion in petroleum revenues.18  Despite this enormous amount of oil 
production, Oganiland “is wracked by unthinkable misery and deprivation.”19
According to an expert on the region, Michael Watts: 
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Climate Justice:  Legal Action to Stop Nigerian Gas Flaring,
http://climatelaw.org/media/gas.flaring.suit (last visited Dec. 10, 2007). 
13. MICHAEL WATTS, Petro-Violence in Nigeria and Ecuador, in VIOLENT 
ENVIRONMENTS 189, 195 (Nancy Lee Peluso & Michael Watts eds., Cornell 
Univ. Press 2001). 
14. Bowoto, supra note 2, at 5.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Watts, supra note 13, at 195.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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Few Ogoni households have electricity; there is one doctor per 100,000 
people, child mortality rates are the highest in the nation; unemployment is 
85 percent; 80 percent of the population is illiterate; and close to half of 
Ogoni youth have left the region in search of work.20 
While Oganiland failed to see any material benefits from oil 
production, it did experience “an environmental nightmare” of oil spills –
either from the pipelines that crisscross Ogoniland, often passing directly 
through villages, or from blowouts at wellheads – and what is known as 
associated gas flaring.21  Associated gas is the gas, often predominately 
methane, that is mixed in with the oil that is pumped from many wells and 
that must either be separated or disposed of through flaring.  In the Delta, 
approximately 76 percent of natural gas is flared, as opposed to just 6 
percent in the United States.22  Despite having no electricity, many of the 
population of the Delta have never known a dark night.23  They have spent 
their entire lives under the perpetual blaze of the gas flares that burn at 
temperatures of 13,000-14,000 degrees Celsius, 24 hours a day.24  Although 
the practice has generally been illegal in Nigeria since 198425, oil 
corporations continue to flare associated gas, producing 35 million tons of 
carbon dioxide and 12 million tons of methane a year, more than the rest of 
the world combined.26 This flaring also contributes to more greenhouse 
gases than all other sub-Saharan African sources combined.27  The flaring of 
associated gas not only releases greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide 
and methane but also a toxic cocktail of particulate matter, combustion by-
products, including sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxides, and carcinogens such 
as benzapryene and dioxin, as well as unburned fuel components, including 
benzene, toluene, xylene, and hydrogen sulfide.28  These chemicals likely 
contribute to the low life expectancy and the high rates of leukemia 
observed in the Delta.29  The flaring of associated gas also creates acid rain 
20. Id.
21. Watts, supra note 13, at 195-96.
22. Id. at 196.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. CLIMATE JUSTICE, GAS FLARING IN NIGERIA 30 (2004),
http://www.climatelaw.org/media/cases/case-documents/nigeria/gas-flaring-
in-nigeria.pdf [hereinafter “Gas Flaring in Nigeria”]
26. Id.
27. Climate Justice, Legal Action to Stop Nigerian Gas Flaring,
http://climatelaw.org/media/ (follow “Legal action to stop Nigeria gas flaring”
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 28, 2009) [hereinafter “Legal Action”].
28. Gas Flaring in Nigeria, supra note 25, at 24.
29. Id. at 2-3.
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which eats through the zinc coated corrugated metal roofs that shelter many 
families from the heavy rains that fall in the Delta.30 
Oil spillage in the Niger Delta and in Oganiland in particular has 
caused even greater harm than the associated gas flaring.  There are roughly 
300 oil spills per year in the Delta, and in one year alone the spills totaled 
almost 700,000 barrels.31  The Nigerian National Petroleum Company 
(“NNPC”) asserts that 2,676 spills occurred between 1976 and 1990, 59
percent of which occurred in Rivers State and 38 percent of which were due 
to equipment malfunction.32  Shell alone spilled 1.6 million gallons of oil 
between 1982 and 1992, which accounted for 36 percent of its spills 
worldwide.33  Ogoniland itself suffered 111 spills between 1985 and 1994, 
and two independent studies revealed that total petroleum hydrocarbons in 
Ogoni streams were 360 and 680 times the European Community’s 
permissible levels.34  For the Ogoni and the other peoples of the Delta the 
fishing and farming that supported them for centuries had become 
impossible by the early 1990’s.  This forced them to protest the oil 
companies’ actions, which led to violent confrontations with the oil 
corporations and their proxies, the Nigerian military.  Ken Saro-Wiwa 
organized the Ogoni into a mass political movement, the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People (hereinafter MOSOP), and drafted an Ogoni Bill 
of Rights which called for Ogoni self-determination and liberation from the 
exploitative practices of the oil companies.35  Severe repression by the 
military government followed, with a string of brutal attacks in 1994, leaving 
750 Ogonis dead.36  All told, nearly 2,000 Ogonis perished at the hands of 
police and security forces since 1990.37  Amidst this violence, Ken Saro-Wiwa 
and eight others were arrested on May 22, 1994 and later convicted of the 
murder of four other Ogoni leaders in what many viewed as a mere show 
trial.38 
The trial of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the repression of the MOSOP 
demonstrated the intimate connection between the Nigerian government 
and the oil companies.  When the local population became resistant to the 
destructive practices of the oil companies and their protests interfered with 
30. E.R. Akpan, Acidic Precipitation and Infrastructural deterioration in Oil
Producing Communities of Akwa Ibom State:  a Case Study of Eket, South Eastern 
Nigeria, 2 Global J. Envtl. Sci. 47, 47-52 (2003).  
31. Watts, supra note 13, at 196.
32. AUGUSTINE A. IKEIN, THE IMPACT OF OIL ON A DEVELOPING COUNTRY:  THE 
CASE OF NIGERIA 171 (Praeger 1990).
33. Id.
34. Watts, supra note 13, at 196.
35. Id. at 197.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 199.
38. Id.
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the flow of oil, the Nigerian government violently suppressed the resistance 
so that the oil might again flow freely out of the country and the wealth flow 
freely into their accounts.  The Nigerian government was thus exposed as 
little more than the hired gun of the oil companies, violently repressing 
resistance to oil exploitation when necessary and making little show of 
delivering its side of the social compact.  The necessities of life such as food, 
water, and security were all notably absent in the Niger Delta, and in 
Ogoniland in particular.  While the true power in resource-dependent 
countries such as Nigeria often lies with transnational corporations based in 
Western countries, international law has largely failed to regulate 
transnationals and has instead left their regulation to the countries in which 
they operate.  As the following section will demonstrate, however, the 
Nigerian government has to a large extent failed to fulfill its administrative 
function in regulating oil companies operating in the Delta.  It will also 
demonstrate that the regional human rights body, the African Commission, 
has failed to remedy this situation.   
III. The Failure of the Nigerian Courts and the African Commission to
Prevent Gas Flaring and Human Rights Abuses 
A. The Failure of Nigerian Courts to Prevent Illegal Flaring
Although Nigerian law has practically banned oil flaring since 1984, the 
practice continues unabated.  Under the Associated Gas Reinjection Act of 
1979, oil corporations are supposed to utilize or re-inject associated gas 
unless the Oil Minister is satisfied that the utilization or re-injection is 
infeasible in a particular field or fields, in which case he may either grant a 
certificate that specifies the terms and conditions under which the gas can 
be flared in the particular field or fields or he may allow continued flaring in 
exchange for payments made to the government.39  Since neither the five 
major oil corporations nor the NNPC have disclosed whether any Ministerial 
certificates have been issued, despite numerous requests by 
environmentalists in Nigeria and abroad, the lawfulness of the continued 
flaring has not been demonstrated.40 
As the Oil Minister had failed to address the gas flaring, on June 20, 
2005, communities from across the Niger Delta filed suit in the Nigeria 
Federal High Court to enjoin Shell from flaring associated gas.41  In a 
remarkable victory for the Nigerian people, on November 14, 2005 the 
Federal High Court ordered Shell to stop its gas flaring immediately as it 
39. Gas Flaring in Nigeria, supra note 25, at 30.
40. Id. at 31
41. Legal Action, supra note 27.
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violated the fundamental human rights of the plaintiffs.42  Shell, however, 
flaunted the High Court’s order and contempt proceedings were initiated 
against it.43  In April 2006, the company was granted “a conditional stay of
execution,” releasing it from the duty to comply with the court order to stop
flaring on the condition that it achieve a quarterly phase-by-phase stoppage 
of its flaring activities in Nigeria at all of its on-shore flow stations by April 
30, 2007, and that it submit a technical scheme detailing this phase-by-
phase arrangement.44  By April 30, 2007, the company had failed to halt its 
flaring.  When the plaintiffs’ lawyer attended court that day, he discovered 
that Shell had failed to submit the detailed scheme as it was ordered to do, 
the justice who had issued the favorable order had been transferred to 
another district, the court file was missing, and no representatives of the 
company or government were present.45 
Despite Shell’s failure to respond to the court’s order, the Nigerian 
government did later order that all gas flaring be halted by December 2007, 
doing so largely in response to internal and international pressure.46  The 
government later pushed this deadline back to January 1, 2008.47  That 
deadline has passed, however, and the gas flaring continues.48  The Nigerian 
courts and government’s orders thus appear to be largely symbolic and 
aimed at legitimating the oil companies’ conduct by making people think 
that something is being done. 
B. The Failure of the Nigerian Government to Remedy Human Rights
Abuses
Much of the human rights abuses committed by the Nigerian 
government at the behest of oil companies are also illegal under Nigerian 
law.  Although courts were suspended during much of the 1990’s under the 
Abacha military regime, in 1999 the Oputa Commission was formed by a 
democratically elected government to investigate the human rights abuses 
42. Jim Lobe, Judge Orders Gas Flaring to Stop Immediately, Inter Press
News Agency (Nov. 14, 2005), available at http://ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews 
=31012. 
43. Shell Fails to Obey Court Order to Stop Nigeria Flaring, Again, available at
http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/nigeria/media/2007May2/ (last visi-
ted Mar. 27, 2009).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Sam Olukoya, Climate Nigeria:  Inefficient Gas Flaring Remains Unchecked,
Inter Press News Agency (Jan. 10, 2008), available at http://ipsnews. 
net/print.asp?idnews=40751.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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committed by prior military regimes.49  Its report stated that the oil 
companies’ interest had become the state’s interest50 and that the state had 
authorized or been complicit in a widespread campaign of “systematic and
generalized violations and abuses.”51  The Commission also found that
under the military regimes “the standard practice [had been] the use of
maximum force against the people of this region by an alliance of Trans 
National Oil Corporations, the state, and the indigenous elite.”52  Set up
under the Commission, the Nigerian Judicial Commission of Enquiry 
investigated particularly heinous attacks such as the murder of 80 people 
and the destruction of almost 500 homes at a Shell facility near the village of 
Umuechem, Rivers States and concluded that such attacks were unprovoked 
and displayed “a reckless disregard for lives and property.”53
While the current civilian government has tempered the military’s 
human rights abuses, the environmental degradations continue unabated. 
This is because the Oputa Commission was formed to investigate and 
acknowledge past abuses by the military regime but was given no power to 
remedy the continuing problem of environmental degradation committed by 
the oil companies. 
C. The Failure of the African Commission to Redress Human Rights
Abuses and Environmental Degradation
The African Commission is a regional human rights body that can hear 
complaints brought by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) against 
states for violations of the African Charter, a regional human rights 
instrument.  Several NGOs brought suit in the African Commission on 
Human Rights alleging that the Nigerian government had violated the 
African Charter by committing human rights abuses against the Ogonis and 
by destroying the environment of Ogoniland through rapacious oil 
extraction.54  The African Commission found that the Nigerian government 
had violated numerous articles of the African Charter by facilitating 
environmental degradation and engaging in human rights abuses in the 
Niger Delta, and in Ogoniland in particular.55 
49. Bowoto, supra note 2, at 6.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 7.
53. Id.
54. The Soc. and Econ. Rights Action Center and the Center for Econ. and Soc.
Rights v. Nigeria, Case 155/96, African Comm’n H.P.R., Decision, at ¶ 9 (May 
27, 2002).  See also GEORGE MUKUNDI WACHIRA, AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN & 
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS:  TEN YEARS ON AND STILL NO JUSTICE 9 (Minority Rights Group 
Int’l 2008).
55. Id. at 15.
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First, the African Commission found the government had violated the 
Nigerians’ right to health guaranteed by Article 16 (1) of the African Charter 
and their right to clean environment guaranteed by Article 24 of the African 
Charter.56  It violated these rights by “[d]irectly participating in the
contamination of air, water, and soil,” by failing “to protect the Ogoni
population from the harm caused by NNPC Shell consortium but instead 
using its security forces to facilitate the damage,” and by failing “to provide
or permit studies of potential or actual environmental and health risks 
caused by the oil operations.”57  The Commission found that to comply with
these articles the government had to 1) permit independent scientific 
monitoring of endangered environments; 2) study the environmental and 
social impact of any major industrial development and publicize the results 
of those studies; 3) monitor those communities exposed to hazardous 
materials and activities; and 4) provide meaningful opportunities for 
individuals to be heard and participate in the development decisions 
affecting their community.58 
Second, the Commission found the government had violated Article 21 
of the African Charter which provides that all “peoples shall freely dispose of
their wealth and natural resources.”59  According to the Commission, the
government violated this Article by giving the “green light” to oil companies
to destroy the environment.60  The Commission thus concluded that the 
government could be held responsible for the conduct of private parties, 
even though the private parties were not party to the African Charter.  This 
reasoning is significant because Nigerian plaintiffs’ attorneys are alleging 
essentially the inverse in U.S. courts, that the oil companies should be held 
liable for the actions of the Nigerian government because they acted in such 
close concert with the government.  As will be demonstrated below, this is 
because the corporations themselves cannot be held liable as principals.  
Third, the Commission found that the Nigerian government had 
violated the right to housing of members of the Ogoni community.61  
According to the Commission, the right to housing was implicit in the right 
to property guaranteed by Article 14 of the African Charter, the right to 
mental and physical health guaranteed by Article 16, and the right to family 
life guaranteed by Article 18(1) of the African Charter because none of these 
rights could be enjoyed without housing.62  The Nigerian government had 
violated the right to housing by destroying houses and villages and by 
56. Id. at ¶ 50.
57. Id.
58. Id. at ¶ 53.
59. Id. at ¶ 55.
60. Id. at ¶ 58.
61. Id. at ¶ 62.
62. Id. at ¶ 60.
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obstructing, harassing, beating and in some cases shooting and killing 
innocent citizens who attempted to return to rebuild their ruined homes.63   
Fourth, the Commission found the Nigerian government had violated 
the right to food implicitly recognized under the right to life guaranteed by 
Article 4 of African Charter, the right to health guaranteed by Article 16, and 
the right to economic, social, and cultural development guaranteed by 
Article 22.64  The African Commission found the Nigerian government had 
violated these rights by allowing its security forces, its state oil company, 
and the private oil companies to destroy food sources.65  It also concluded 
that the government had created significant obstacles to the local 
communities’ efforts to feed themselves by a widespread campaign of 
terror.66   
Finally, the Commission found the government had violated the right 
to life guaranteed by Article 4 of the African Charter by carrying out 
extrajudicial killings and by degrading the environment.67  After conducting a 
weeklong mission to the Niger Delta in March 1997, the Commission 
became convinced that the “pollution and environmental degradation . . .
has made living in the Ogoni land a nightmare.”68  According to the
Commission, the “survival of the Ogonis depended on their land and farms”
and these lands and farms “were destroyed by the direct involvement of the
Government.”69
While the suit was initially brought to address the abuses committed 
by the Abacha military regime, the advisory opinion appealed to the current 
civilian regime to cease violations it feared were persisting and to 
implement new policies and laws aimed at redressing the human rights 
abuses and environmental degradations.70  These included providing 
environmental impact assessments on any future oil development projects, 
creating effective oversight bodies, and providing information on health and 
environmental risks and meaningful access to regulatory bodies.71  Despite 
the appeal of the Commission to the Nigerian government to cease 
engaging in those activities that violated the African Charter, in a 2004 
report, Amnesty International stated that it remained “very concerned that
civil and political as well as economic, social, and cultural rights are being 
violated and abused in the process of the oil exploration and production in 
63. Id. at ¶ 62.
64. Id. at ¶ 64.
65. Id. at ¶ 66.
66. Id.
67. Id. at ¶ 67.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 15.
71. Id.
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the Niger Delta.”72  That these violations continue despite the opinion of the
African Commission indicates that the African Commission has not been 
particularly effective in achieving compliance with the African Charter. 
Nonetheless, as will be demonstrated below, the administrative remedy that 
it has proposed would be a far more effective and direct way of regulating oil 
companies’ conduct than that pursued by American plaintiffs’ attorneys 
bringing suit in U.S. Federal courts. 
For regional human rights bodies such as the African Commission to 
be effective in achieving compliance with regional human rights instruments 
such as the African Charter there must be widespread regional respect for 
human rights norms and there must be significant dependence upon 
regional trade for sanctions to be an effective method of coercion.73  In Africa 
both of these elements are sorely lacking.  First, there are “massive
violations on a continent of immense diversity, where a tradition of 
domestic compliance with human rights norms is still to be established.”74
Second, “the trade and communication links that are necessary to exercise
influence over member states in many cases do not exist.”75  Sanctions
imposed by other African states are particularly unlikely to influence Nigeria, 
given that 90 percent of its GDP comes from the sale and export of oil, 
largely to the United States and Europe. 
Since the Nigerian Government and the African Charter have failed to 
remedy past environmental degradation and human rights abuses, plaintiffs’ 
lawyers in the United States have turned to U.S. courts to seek redress from 
U.S. corporations.  As the following sections shall demonstrate, it is 
particularly difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in such cases, especially on 
their environmental claims.  However, the following sections will argue that 
they may be more successful if they allege trans-boundary environmental 
harm as opposed to purely local environmental harm. 
IV. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Environmental Law
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Although no U.S. environmental statute that applies to corporations 
acting in the U.S. has yet been applied to corporate action abroad,76 in 
72. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NIGERIA:  ARE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PIPELINE? 
1 (2004) 1.
73. Christof Heyns, The African Regional Human Rights System:  The African
Charter, 108 Penn. St. L. Rev. 679, 700-701 (Winter 2004).
74. Id. at 701.
75. Id.
76. See Peggy Rodgers Kalas, International Environmental Dispute Resolution
and the Need for Access by Non-State Actors, 12 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 191, 
193-194 (2001).
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certain very limited circumstances it might be possible enjoin corporate 
conduct abroad based on extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental 
law.  While courts have found strong policy reasons in favor of extra-
territorial application of U.S. trademark and penal laws,77 Nigerian plaintiffs 
would be unlikely to convince a court to apply U.S. environmental statutes 
extraterritorially because most federal environmental statutes do not 
expressly apply extraterritorially.78  In the absence of an express grant of 
jurisdiction, courts look to congressional intent to discover whether the 
statute was meant to be applied abroad.79  Without any evidence that 
Congress intended to apply the statute abroad, there is a presumption 
against extraterritorial application.80  This is because courts assume that 
“Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.”81  Courts have
also expressed the fear that the imposition of the values and requirements 
of U.S. law inside the borders of another nation could impinge upon the 
sovereignty of the other nation and lead to a cultural clash,82 if not an actual 
conflict of laws.  
To rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality, Nigerian plaintiffs 
would have to assert that Congress intended the statute to apply abroad in 
order to hold corporations accountable for environmental harms.  Since 
there is usually little evidence of congressional intent to apply U.S. 
77. See United States v. Larsen, 952 F.2d 1099, 1100 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The
Supreme Court has explained that to limit the locus of some offenses ‘to the 
strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and 
usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as 
easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at 
home.’  United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).”).  See also Thomas & 
Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 71 F. Supp. 2d 838, 841 (E.D. Ill. 1999) (“It has long 
been established that the United States is not debarred by any rule of 
international law from governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the 
high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or 
their nationals are not infringed.  Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. at 285 (quoting 
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941).”).
78. See Paul Boudreaux, Biodiversity and a New “Best Case” for Applying the
Environmental Statutes Extraterritorially, 37 Envtl. L. 1107, 1110 (2007) (observing 
that for most statutory commands “Congress makes no reference to the 
nation’s boundaries.”).
79. See United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1991).
80. See Larsen, 952 F.2d at 1100.
81. Foley v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
82. See id. at 293-94.  See also Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian
American Oil Co. [hereinafter Aramco], 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), quoting 
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 
(1963).
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environmental statutes abroad,83 Nigerian plaintiffs would have difficulty in 
doing so. 
Nigerian plaintiffs attempting to apply U.S. environmental statutes 
extraterritorially would also face a reluctance by courts to apply U.S. laws 
extraterritorially when civil or environmental rights are asserted.84  This 
reluctance has been reflected in the different approach courts have taken to 
the extraterritorial application of U.S laws in so-called “market” cases, such
as patent and fraud cases, as opposed to so-called “non-market” cases.  In
the latter there has been a practically “irrebuttable presumption against
extraterritoriality,” while in “market” cases, courts have “readily allowed the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law.”85  The courts have probably created
this distinction in order to protect U.S. interests, readily applying U.S. law 
extraterritorially when they believe that it would serve U.S. economic 
interests and failing to do so when they perceive that it would harm U.S. 
economic interests86 or have untoward political effects.  Since courts would 
likely consider application of U.S. environmental statutes to environmental 
degradation abroad to be against U.S. economic and political interests, it 
would be unlikely that Nigerian plaintiffs could overcome the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. 
B. National Environmental Policy Act
While most U.S. courts are unlikely to apply U.S. law extraterritorially, 
the few cases that have addressed the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
83. See Boudreaux, supra note 78, at 1110.
84. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 253 (concluding that Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act did not apply extraterritorially to a naturalized citizen who 
worked in a foreign country for an American corporation).  
85. See Mark P. Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law:  The
Perversion of Democratic Governance, the Reversal of Institutional Roles, and the 
Imperative of Establishing Normative Principles, 19 B.C. Int’l Comp. L. Rev. 297, 304 
(1996).
86. See Natalie Bridgeman, Human Rights Litigation Under the ATCA as a
Proxy For Environmental Claims, 6 Yale H.R. & Dev. L.J. 1, 29 (2003) (stating that 
the bifurcation between market and non-market cases “may be the result of 
self-serving political realism, resulting in courts’ bias toward protecting U.S. 
economic interests even at the expense of trampling sovereignty, and 
hesitancy toward imposing social and environmental protections beyond 
our borders – the latter being conceived of as areas that sovereign nations 
should control territorially.”)  See also Gibney, supra note 85, at 304 (“U.S. 
law has been applied extraterritorially when that has served the national 
interest of the United States or its corporate actors, and it has been given a 
territorial application when a restrictive interpretation would serve those 
same ends.”).
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environmental law have not totally foreclosed the possibility.  In particular, 
the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)87 might be used to require
U.S. agencies to submit an environmental impact statement (EIS)88 for 
development projects abroad that they facilitated by providing loans or 
insurance to corporations.89  When federal agencies such as the U.S. Export 
Import bank (“ExIm Bank”) or the Oversees Private Insurance Corporation
(“OPIC”) finance or guarantee a development project abroad but fail to
prepare an EIS there might be a sufficient basis for a claim under NEPA.90  
The most that plaintiffs could achieve, however, would be the temporary 
injunction of the project until an EIS was completed.91 
Although ExIm Bank and OPIC have refused to acknowledge that there 
is an EIS requirement under NEPA for actions they have taken abroad,92 
Congress used broad language in the statute itself, expressing its general 
concern with the relationship between “man and his environment.”93
President Carter also issued an Executive Order in 1979 that required federal 
agencies to undertake NEPA obligations when engaged in major actions that 
affect the “global commons” or that involve the creation or use of toxic
products or pollution.94  More importantly, the early NEPA cases accepted 
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2000).
88. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C).  An environmental impact statement (EIS)
fulfills the statement requirement but it is only required if the project is 
“major” and has “significant” environmental impacts. See Robertson v. Methow 
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1-.25 (2004). 
An agency must first prepare a short report called an environmental 
assessment (EA) to determine if the project will create significant 
environmental impacts.  40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2004).  Agencies find significant 
impacts requiring an EIS in less than 1% of federal actions.  Bradford C. 
Mank, Standing and Global Warming:  Is injury to All Injury to None, 35 Envtl. L. 1, 
46 (2005).
89. See Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal.,
2007); Hirt v. Richardson, 127 F. Supp. 2d 833 (W.D. Mich. 1999); Envtl. Def. 
Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. 
Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 
647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
90. Bridgeman, supra note 86, at 30.
91. Id.
92. Silvia M. Riechel, Governmental Hypocrisy and the Extraterritorial
Application of NEPA, 26 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 115, 120 n.45 (1994) (citing 
Note, The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA’s Environmental Impact Statement 
Requirement, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 349, 350 (1975)).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
94. See Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356-60 (1980).
  
West  Northwest, Vol. 15, No. 2, Sumer 2009 
385 
its extraterritorial application95 and in Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey the 
D.C. Circuit Court held that NEPA applied to the incineration of food wastes
in Antarctica and that an EIS was therefore required.96  The first ground the
court employed for avoiding the presumption against extraterritoriality was
that NEPA only imposes a duty to create the EIS document within the
United States and that the agency decision making occurred within the
United States.97  The second ground the court relied upon for avoiding the
presumption against extraterritoriality was that the substantive agency
conduct would take place in Antarctica, an area of the “global commons”
where a clash with foreign law was unlikely to occur.98  Relying upon the
Massey court’s statement that it was not deciding “how NEPA might apply to
actions in a case involving an actual foreign sovereign,”99 subsequent courts
have limited Massey’s holding to facts involving substantive agency action in
the global commons100 or to facts involving major federal action.101  It would
be difficult therefore to convince a court that the EIS requirement of NEPA
applied to federal agency actions conducted on the soil of a sovereign such
as Nigeria.
Probably the most effective way to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritorial application of NEPA would be to argue that the harm or 
potential harm resulting from a foreign development project would occur in 
the U.S. and that extraterritorial application was therefore unnecessary.  In 
Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, a coalition of American environmental groups 
and cities brought suit against OPIC and ExIm Bank for failing to comply 
95. Nat’l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. U.S. Dept. of State, 452 F.
Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978) (finding federal agencies in violation of NEPA as to 
their involvement in a poppy plant and marijuana herbicide spraying 
program in Mexico); see also People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. 
Haw. 1973) (granting an injunction of the Pacific Cratering Experiments on 
Enewetak Atoll until completion of an EIS). 
96. Massey, 986 F.2d at 536-537.
97. Id. at 529.
98. Id. at 533.
99. Id. at 537.
100. See Basel Action Network v. Mari. Admin., 370 F. Supp. 2d 57, 71
(D.D.C. 2005) (holding that NEPA does not require an EIS for federal actions 
taken overseas); see also NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin  837 F. Supp. 466, 468 
(D.D.C. 1993) (holding that the presumption did apply to a NEPA claim 
directed at various activities on U.S. military bases in Japan because there 
might be a clash with Japanese law or numerous treaties with Japan which 
governed the duties of the U.S. on its bases in Japan). 
101. Mayaguezanos Por La Salud Y El Ambiene v. United States 198 F.3d 297
(1st Cir. 1999) (dismissing the claim because there was insufficient proof 
that the shipment of nuclear waste from France to Japan constituted a major 
federal action).
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with NEPA in funding or insuring fossil fuel development projects abroad 
that contributed significantly to global warming, thereby imperiling the 
domestic environment.102  The plaintiffs identified seven particular projects 
of OPIC and ExIm Bank which they claimed were subject to NEPA 
requirements and which contributed significantly to global warming.103  
Although these projects are all located in foreign countries and would 
therefore appear not be subject to NEPA, a federal district court in the Ninth 
Circuit denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and accepted 
the Plaintiffs’ argument that they were only seeking “to apply NEPA because
the projects that Defendants support purportedly affect the domestic 
environment.”104  The rather perverse result of this ruling is that foreigners
whose lives and lands have been totally devastated by these projects will 
face a virtual bar against suit under NEPA – due to the presumption against 
extraterritoriality – whereas domestic plaintiffs will merely have to claim a 
diffuse and nebulous domestic injury resulting from development projects’ 
contribution to global warming. 
While the court in Mosbacher indicated that the plaintiffs might have 
difficulty establishing causation at later proceedings,105 it is significant that 
in a previous order the court found that the plaintiffs had standing.106  In 
denying defendants’ motion to dismiss in this prior order, the court rejected 
defendants’ argument that ExIm Bank’s and OPIC’s role in financing the 
projects that produce the greenhouse gas emissions was too attenuated to 
justify standing.107  The court also explained that when a plaintiff asserted a 
procedural violation “some uncertainty about redressability or causation is
allowed.”108  This was because “such plaintiffs need not present proof that
the challenged federal project will have particular environmental effects,”
but need only demonstrate that “it is reasonably probable that the
challenged action will threaten their concrete interests.”109
The presumption against the extraterritorial application of NEPA to 
fossil fuel projects in Nigeria might be avoided in the Ninth Circuit as it was 
in Mosbacher by arguing Americans were harmed domestically by OPIC’s and 
102. Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889, 892 (N.D. Cal.
2007).
103. Id. at 897.
104. Id. at 908.
105. Id.
106. Friends of the Earth v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42335, 15 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2005).  The court may have found the 
plaintiffs had standing because they were raising a claim involving 
procedural issues and therefore did not need to show that substantive 
environmental harm was imminent.  Id. at 8.
107. Id. at 10.
108. Id. at 7.
109. Id. at 8-9.
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ExIm Bank’s failure to comply with NEPA in their financing of Nigerian fossil 
fuel projects that emitted greenhouse gases that contributed to global 
warming.110  The involvement of these agencies in such projects is 
significant, with OPIC investing $270 million and ExIm Bank $124 million in 
oil and gas projects in Nigeria between 1992 and 2002.111  Given that the 
court in Mosbacher found that it was proper to challenge the cumulative 
global warming impacts of several fossil fuel projects assisted by OPIC and 
ExIm Bank, it would seem that in the Ninth Circuit plaintiffs could challenge 
the cumulative global warming impacts of various fossil fuel projects that 
OPIC and ExIm Bank have financed and insured in Nigeria.  It also would 
appear that plaintiffs would not have to prove the development projects 
would not have been built without the assistance of OPIC and ExIm Bank as 
long as they could submit evidence demonstrating a strong link between the 
agencies’ assistance and the energy-related projects.   
Although plaintiffs might avoid the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, neither OPIC nor ExIm Bank have yet been found in 
violation of NEPA for failing to draw up an EIS for a foreign development 
project that contributes to global warming.  Plaintiffs would face 
considerable difficulty in proving causation in such a suit if it actually went 
to trial.  The greenhouse gas emissions of the fossil fuel projects that OPIC 
and ExIm Bank have assisted in Nigeria are miniscule compared to total 
emissions world-wide, and it would be enormously difficult to ascribe any 
potential harm to domestic plaintiffs from these projects. 
C. Endangered Species Act
Another U.S. environmental statute that might be used to address 
environmental degradation in Nigeria is the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”).112  While Section 7 of ESA does not provide a cause of action against
corporations, it might be used like NEPA to enjoin a foreign development 
project assisted by a federal agency.  Section 7 of the ESA states that a 
federal agency shall insure that any action it carries out, authorizes, or funds 
“is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species.”113  Before taking any action that might
threaten the existence of an endangered species, a federal agency must 
therefore consult with an expert wildlife agency which issues a Biological 
110. To avoid the prohibition against raising the claims of third parties
(often referred to as a prudential standing barrier) and to better refute the 
government’s inevitable argument that NEPA does not apply extra-
territorially, it would probably be unwise for Nigerian plaintiffs to join suit. 
111. Economic Justice News, Nigerian Women Take on Oil Companies in
Nigeria (Oct. 2002), available at http://www.50years.org/cms/ejn/story/82.
112. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
113. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
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Opinion explaining whether or not the proposed action would unlawfully 
“jeopardize” the species.114  If the Opinion finds the agency action would
jeopardize the species, the agency risks being in violation of ESA’s take 
prohibitions if its actions result in harm to the listed species.  115  This 
effective prohibition on actions that would jeopardize an endangered 
species makes Sction 7 much more powerful than NEPA.   
Although Section 7 of ESA is more powerful than NEPA, plaintiffs’ 
lawyers attempting to apply Section 7 to development projects in Nigeria 
would face the same presumption against extraterritoriality as in the case of 
NEPA.  This is because the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Defenders of Wildlife v. 
Lujan (hereinafter Lujan) that section 7 applies to agency actions overseas116 
was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court for lack of standing.117  Although the 
Court did not rule on the merits, Justice Stevens in a concurring opinion 
concluded that Section 7 does not apply extraterritorially.118  The issue has 
not been ruled on by an appellate court since the Supreme Court decision. 
The plaintiffs in Lujan argued before both the Eighth Circuit and the 
Supreme Court that the language of the ESA demonstrated congressional 
intent to apply Section 7 to agency actions in other countries119 because it 
imposes duties to consult with an expert agency and to avoid jeopardy on 
“any action” undertaken by a federal agency.120  In attempting to bolster their
argument that Section 7 applies abroad, the plaintiffs relied upon a district 
court’s conclusion that “[t]he language and mandate is all-inclusive; it could
not be more broad” and therefore should be read to apply abroad.121  The
problem with this argument is that it conflates silence with intent, just what 
the presumption against extraterritoriality was meant to prevent.  Indeed, if 
Congress had really wanted to apply Section 7 abroad, it could have stated 
that Section 7’s duties apply “throughout the world,” or it could have specified
“on the high seas,” as it did for the no-take prohibitions of Section 9.122
The plaintiffs also argued that Congressional intent to apply Section 7 
of the ESA abroad was evidenced by other provisions of the ESA that clearly 
considered international protection of wildlife.  One of these were its 
“findings” which explained that international treaties and conventions on
the protection of species had provided much of the impetus for passage of 
114. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b).
115. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(p).
116. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), rev’d Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan,
504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
117. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578.
118. Id. at 581 (Stevens, J., concurring).
119. Brief for Respondents at 6, Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 (1991) (No. 90-1424).
120. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
121. Defenders of the Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Minn. 1989).
122. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(C).
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the act.123  Another was ESA’s Section 4, which provides that the government 
must consider “efforts” to protect the species taken in a “foreign nation”
when determining whether to list the species as endangered.124   
Unfortunately, there is language in the ESA that cuts against the 
plaintiffs’ argument that Congress intended to apply Section 7 abroad.  The 
first clause of the ESA refers to species within the U.S.125  A later section 
explains that such species are valuable “to the Nation and its people.”126
Moreover, the treaties and conventions that the ESA references concern 
species that migrate to and from the United States or inhabit the high seas, 
not species that exist solely in a foreign country.  It would appear therefore 
that there is not a clear congressional intent to apply Section 7 abroad. 
Nonetheless, the plaintiffs succeeded in convincing the Eighth Circuit 
in Lujan that Section 7 applies extraterritorially.  However, the Eighth 
Circuit’s reasoning was weak and effectively ignored the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.  The court took the “expansive language” of ESA’s
Section 7 that “admits to no exceptions”127 and ESA’s definition of
“endangered species” that includes “no geographic limitation,”128 to be
convincing evidence that Congress intended Section 7 to apply abroad.  The 
Eighth Circuit therefore concluded “that congressional intent can be gleaned
from the plain language of the Act.”129  By thus reading congressional silence
and broad language to be evidence of intent to apply Section 7 abroad, the 
Eighth Circuit effectively negated the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
making it unlikely that another appellate court would repeat its reasoning.130  
Plaintiffs also would have difficulty overcoming the presumption against the 
extraterritorial application of Section 7 of ESA because the expert federal 
wildlife agencies charged with administering ESA now interpret Section 7 as 
applying only domestically.131   
123. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4) (listing international treaties concerning
species protection).
124. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
125. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1).
126. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3).
127. Lujan, 911 F.2d at 122.
128. Id. at 123.
129. Id.
130. See Boudreaux, supra note 78, at 1130 (concluding that since the
Eighth Circuit’s reasoning would obliterate the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, “it is unlikely that another appellate court would repeat” 
it.).  But see Mary A. McDougall, Comment, Extraterritoriality and the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973, 80 Geo. L.J. 435, 437 (1991) (arguing the Eighth Circuit’s 
opinion was correct but poorly reasoned). 
131. Interagency Cooperation-Endangered Species Act of 1973, Final
Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 19926 (June 3, 1986) (codified in part at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402 
(2000)). 
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As the language, the legislative background, and the regulatory 
interpretation of Section 7 of ESA make it unlikely that a plaintiff could 
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, Paul Boudreaux has 
suggested that plaintiffs should argue that their domestic interests in the 
preservation of endangered species are threatened by federal agency actions 
taken abroad.132  They could thus base their arguments on those cases in 
which the presumption against extraterritoriality was overcome because the 
foreign conduct affected interests within the United States.  In one such 
case, Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., the Supreme Court applied the Lanham Act to 
a trademark violation claim that occurred in Mexico.133  It did so in large part 
because the selling of fake “Bulova” watches in Mexico harmed domestic
interests in the United States, since some of the fake watches made it across 
the border into the United States.134 
In order to persuade a court to apply Section 7 of ESA to Nigerian 
fossil fuel projects assisted by federal agencies, plaintiffs would have to 
argue that domestic interests were harmed, namely the preservation of 
endangered species that exist exclusively or temporarily within the United 
States.135  These projects may harm domestic species by releasing large 
amounts of greenhouse gases that contribute significantly to global 
warming.  As has been observed above, the flaring of associated gas in 
Nigeria makes Nigeria the largest contributor to greenhouse gases in sub-
Saharan Africa.  OPIC and ExIm Bank are directly implicated in the 
enormously wasteful process by financing numerous fossil fuel projects in 
Nigeria.  Although the exact impact of such emissions on endangered 
species in the United States is impossible to calculate, it is clear that global 
warming itself is destroying many endangered species.  If a court were to 
employ the relaxed standing test that the court did in Mosbacher for 
procedural injuries, plaintiffs might be able to survive a motion to dismiss. 
However, causation would probably prove to be insurmountable at later 
stages of litigation. 
Another argument for applying Section 7 of ESA to fossil fuel projects 
in Nigeria could focus on the domestic effects of oil spills.  As there are an 
enormous amount of oil spills in Nigeria, plaintiffs could argue that 
132. Boudreaux, supra note 78, at 1134.
133. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co, 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
134. Id. at 289.  In Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993), the
Supreme Court again applied U.S. business law extraterritorially.  It held that 
the Sherman Act, which bans restraints of trade, applied to anti-competitive 
conduct engaged in by re-insurance companies acting inside the United 
Kingdom.  Id. at 799.  The Supreme Court did not even mention the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality; instead it relied on lower court precedent 
holding that the Sherman Act applied to anti-competitive activity in other 
countries when it affected commerce inside the United States.  Id. at 796.
135. See Boudreaux, supra note 78, at 1134.
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endangered fish and whales that inhabit the Atlantic are threatened by this 
contamination of the oceans, either because it harms them directly or 
because it harms the species upon which they depend for survival.  Again, 
causation would probably prove to be insurmountable at later stages of 
litigation. 
A potentially more effective way to apply Section 7 of ESA to Nigerian 
fossil fuel projects would be to argue that these projects are threatening 
Nigerian species that could potentially be the sources of future medicines 
and products that could be exploited by U.S. companies.  This is because 
ESA itself was justified by Congress and the Senate as a means of preserving 
“biodiversity” and threats to domestic biodiversity can arise within the
United States or abroad.  The preservation of biodiversity justification for 
ESA was explained by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 
National Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt.136  There the court rejected a 
constitutional challenge to ESA’s “take” prohibition137 for species that live
within only one state because the rationale of ESA was to preserve genetic 
“biodiversity” for future generations and actions that threatened biodiversity
would have a substantial impact on interstate commerce.138  The 
preservation of biodiversity was thus important because “current and future
interstate commerce . . . relies upon it.”139  Specifically, the court recognized
that “endangered plants and animals are valuable as sources of medicine
and genes.”140  Indeed, “[f]ifty percent of the most frequently prescribed
medicines are derived from wild plant and animal species” and such
medicines brought in over $15 billion a year in 1983.141 
Although the court in Babbitt was concerned with an exclusively 
domestic species that was threatened by domestic actions, the court’s 
comments about the value of genetic diversity apply equally to foreign 
activities such as Nigerian fossil fuel projects that harm domestic species.  It 
should not be difficult to establish that many species are on the verge of 
extinction or have already gone extinct because of the operations of oil 
companies.  The African Slender Snouted Crocodile, African Dwarf Crocodile, 
and Congo Dwarf Crocodile have all been listed as threatened or 
endangered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service142 and are directly 
136. National Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
137. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a).
138. Babbitt, 130 F.3d at 1052-53.
139. Id. at 1052.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Threatened and Endangered Species
System, http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/SpeciesReport.do?lead=10&listing 
Type=L (last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
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threatened by oil exploitation abroad.143  The Niger Elephant, River 
Hippopotamus, and White Crested Monkey are also directly threatened by 
oil exploitation.144  Moreover, U.S. companies are already developing new 
medicines from the numerous wild species that exist in the Niger Delta.  For 
example, Xechem, a corporation headquartered in New Brunswick, New 
Jersey, developed a drug that successfully treats sickle cell anemia from a 
combination of three different native Nigerian plants.145  After developing 
this drug and recognizing the economic potential in the incredibly 
biologically diverse mangroves of the Niger Delta, Xechem opened a 
pharmaceutical plant in Abuja Nigeria which is involved in the discovery, 
cultivation, and extraction of potentially medicinal chemicals from the wild 
plants that have flourished until recently in the region.146  To allow the 
continued degradation of the biologically rich regions of the Niger Delta 
when U.S. corporations are just beginning to harvest and capitalize upon 
them would imperil future development of this burgeoning and lucrative 
industry and cut off future generations from the enjoyment of new drugs and 
products.  Plaintiffs could therefore argue that Nigerian species should not 
be threatened by U.S. agency actions when they could be critical to future 
economic development in the United States. 
A court that is unwilling to apply Section 7 of ESA to Nigerian fossil 
fuel projects might also assert that the imposition of U.S. law to actions that 
took place in Nigeria would lead to a “cultural clash.”  Although this is a
possibility, Nigeria generally has strong environmental laws.  But, as the gas 
flaring case illustrates, its environmental laws are not being enforced.  If 
plaintiffs could establish that Nigerian remedies had been exhausted or 
could not be obtained without undue delay, then there would be less of a 
chance of a cultural clash that would counsel against extraterritorial 
application. 
Although domestic plaintiffs seeking to protect their interest in 
Nigerian biodiversity would have less trouble with the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, they would have considerable difficulty establishing 
standing.  According to the Supreme Court in Lujan, domestic plaintiffs 
would have to demonstrate that they have (1) suffered a concrete and 
particularized injury in fact, which (2) is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the result [of] the 
143. HENRY CLARK, ET. AL, OIL FOR NOTHING:  MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, 
ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION, DEATH AND IMPUNITY IN THE NIGER DELTA 8 (1999), 
available at http://www.essentialaction.org/shell/Final_Report.pdf.
144. Id.
145. VINCENT ZUBERO, U.S. EX-IM BANK APPROVES COMPREHENSIVE 
GUARANTEE FOR UPS CAPITAL LOAN OF $9.38 MILLION TO FUND ESTABLISHMENT OF
XECHEM PHARMACEUTICAL PLANT IN NIGERIA 1 (2005), available at http://www. 
ewire.com/display.cfm/Wire_ID/3446.
146. Id.
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independent action of some third party not before the court,” and (3) which
is likely to be “redressed by a favorable decision.”147  The Supreme Court
reversed the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Lujan, holding that the plaintiffs 
failed to submit evidence that they were directly injured by the governments’ 
funding of activities abroad that threatened listed species.148  That two of the 
plaintiffs had visited locations in the past where the endangered species 
existed149 and had an asserted interest in seeing and studying them in the 
future was not sufficient to establish standing.150 
One of the ways to avoid the standing problems encountered in Lujan 
would be to join as plaintiffs biotechnology firms that engage in developing 
new medicines and products from wild species.  They could allege, relying 
upon the legislative history of ESA and upon the reasoning of Babbitt, that 
they are one of the objects of ESA’s protections, and that the agency actions 
in financing fossil fuel projects in Nigeria threaten their future economic 
viability by destroying some of their sources of the biological building 
blocks that they exploit in creating new medicines and products.151  This 
potential harm, however, could be viewed as being too conjectural to 
constitute an injury in fact.  This is because it is not clear that the relatively 
few species listed will eventually lead to any remunerative medical 
breakthroughs.  Nonetheless, if plaintiffs could establish standing, alleging 
the destruction of Nigerian species would probably be the most effective 
way of applying Section 7 to agency actions conducted there. 
Even if plaintiffs could convince to a court apply NEPA or Section 7 of 
ESA to Nigerian development projects assisted by federal agencies, the 
corporations engaged in developing these projects could probably find 
financial assistance from institutions other than those that are part of the 
U.S. government.  If that were so, neither the obligations of NEPA or Section 
7 of ESA would apply.  It would only be those rare projects that private or 
foreign national financial institutions considered too risky or expensive to 
assist that could be completely prevented from going forward.  NEPA and 
Section 7 of ESA are therefore ineffective for the harms caused by the 
majority of development projects in Nigeria and elsewhere. 
147. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
148. Id. at 563.
149. Id. at 563-64.
150. Id. at 566-67.
151. See id. at 561-62 (“When the suit is one challenging the legality of
government action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be 
averred (at the summary judgment stage) or proved (at the trial stage) in 
order to establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff 
is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he is, there 
is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, 
and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.”).
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V. The Alien Tort Claims Statute: Introduction to the Statute
Unlike NEPA or Section 7 of ESA, the Alien Tort Claims Statute (“ATS”)
enables foreign plaintiffs to bring suit directly against corporations for their 
actions abroad.  However, the ATS is not currently a viable way to bring 
environmental claims against corporations because environmental 
degradation is not generally considered by U.S. courts to be a violation of 
the law of nations.  As the following will demonstrate, a narrow exception 
might exist for transnational environmental harm. 
A. Brief History of the Alien Tort Statute
The ATS, created under the Judiciary Act of 1789, declares that “the
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”152  The ATS was only used 21 times in the 190 years following
its passage and had only been used successfully twice.153  In 1980, however, a 
Paraguayan family brought suit under the ATS against a former Paraguayan 
police inspector general for the torture and death of their family member 
Joelito Filartiga.  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala154 opened the door to suits brought 
under the ATS for human rights abuses that occurred abroad.  Numerous 
ATS cases have subsequently been brought in U.S. courts, primarily for 
human rights abuses. 
B. Structure of the Statue in Light of Sosa
Plaintiffs must assert three elements to bring a claim under the ATS. 
They must assert that (1) they are aliens, (2) they are suing for a tort, and (3) 
the tort violates the law of nations.  The third element is generally the focus 
of dispute, as it is the most difficult to establish.  The law of nations as 
defined in 1789 encompassed both treaty-based and customary 
international law.155  Since suing under a treaty requires that the treaty have 
been ratified by the U.S., be self-executing,156and not have a reservation to 
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
153. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law
Claims:  Inquiries Into the Alien Tort Claims Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1, 4-5 
n.15 (1985).
154. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
155. See generally The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (defining
customary international law as state practice stemming from a legal 
obligation, or opinio juris).  See also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States § 102(2) (1987). 
156. See Fuji v. State 38 Cal. 2d 718, 722 (1952) (“In order for a treaty
provision to be operative without the aid of implementing legislation and to 
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the relevant article,157 most plaintiffs allege violations of customary 
international law.  Although U.S. courts look to all the traditional sources of 
international law in determining whether an act violates the customary 
international law,158 in practice they apply a considerably narrower version of 
customary international law than many international courts. 
The Second Circuit in Filartiga began the process of narrowing what 
claims were actionable under the ATS.  Although it acknowledged that a rule 
need only “command the ‘general assent of civilized nations’ to become
binding upon them all,”159 it also implied that the rule needed to be
universally recognized.160  However, customary international law derives from 
(1) the consistent conduct of states (2) acting out of the belief that the law
required them to act that way.161  Complete uniformity in assenting to or
acquiescing in a norm is therefore not required.  Thus certain international
environmental norms, such as the principle of sustainable development,
may be part of customary international law but are not actionable under the
ATS because they do not satisfy Filartiga.162
The courts following Filartiga generally agreed that the ATS provided 
not only a jurisdictional grant, but also a substantive cause of action for 
have the force and effect of a statute, it must appear that the framers of the 
treaty intended to prescribe a rule that, standing alone, would be 
enforceable in the courts.”).
157. See Domingues v. State of Nevada, 114 Nev. 783, 785 (1998), cert. denied
528 U.S. 963 (1999) (“We conclude that the Senate’s express reservation of 
the United States’ right to impose a penalty of death on juvenile offenders 
negates Domingues’ claim that he was illegally sentenced.”).
158. To be a norm recognized under the law of nations a norm must be
(a) codified as international law through international treaties or
conventions, (b) established as customary international law, (c) determined
to be the law of nations in scholarly writings and judicial decisions, or (d)
has been accepted as a general principle of law. See Anthony Clark Arend,
LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 45-53 (1999).  See also Filartiga, 630
F.2d at 881, quoting Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945).
159. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
160. See id. at 882.
161. MYRES MCDOUGAL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:  THE 
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 269 (1980).  See 
also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-11 (6th ed. 2003).
162. See Case Concerning The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v.
Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25, 1997) [hereinafter “Gabcikovo Dam Case”] 
(“International law in the field of sustainable development is now 
sufficiently well established, and both parties appear to accept this.”) 
(citations omitted).
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violations of U.S. treaties and the law of nations.163  The U.S. Supreme Court 
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, however, unanimously agreed that the ATS “is in its
terms only jurisdictional.”164  Nonetheless, the majority interpreted the ATS
to incorporate a limited number of common law causes of action based on 
those few international law violations with a potential for individual liability 
that existed in 1789, such as offenses against ambassadors, violations of 
conduct, piracy, and prize claims involving the seizure of ships.165  Although 
the Court did not preclude all new causes of action arising out of evolving 
international norms, it cautioned lower courts to only entertain claims 
based on violations of the present-day law of nations that rested “on a norm
of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th century paradigms we have 
recognized.”166  The majority concluded therefore “that the door is still ajar
subject to vigilant door-keeping, and thus open to a narrow class of 
international norms today.”167
The Court in Sosa concluded that the case before it, which involved a 
claim of arbitrary arrest and detention, did not meet this standard because 
there was no clear universally recognized norm of international law 
prohibiting arbitrary arrest and a detention lasting less than one day.168  This 
conclusion, however, is not entirely consistent with a long history of 
international human and civil rights law that prohibited arrest and 
imprisonment without due process dating back to the Bill of Rights and the 
Magna Carta169 and subsequently codified in every international and regional 
human rights instrument170 and affirmed in national constitutions around 
163. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 366 (E.D. La. 1997) (“The current view of [28 
U.S.C. §] 1350 is that it grants a federal cause of action as well as a federal 
forum in which to assert the claim.”). 
164. Sosa v. Alvarez-Manchain, 542 U.S. 692, 719 (2004).
165. Id. at 720.
166. Id. at 725.
167. Id. at 746.
168. Id. at 738.
169. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice:
Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National 
Constitutions, 3 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 235, 254 (1993).
170. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 9 (Dec. 12, 1948) (“No one shall be subject to arbitrary 
arrest, detention, or exile.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (Dec. 
16, 1966); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 5, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 
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the world.171  Those domestic courts that have confronted the issue have 
repeatedly concluded that arbitrary arrests and detention violate 
international law.172 
The majority of the Court in Sosa believed that one of the “good
reasons for a restrained conception of the discretion a federal court should 
exercise in considering a new cause of action of this kind”173 was that the
Court’s 1938 decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins174 prohibited federal 
courts from making general federal common law, except in certain narrow 
categories of cases.175  These include various “havens of specialty” where
federal common law-making is required and interstitial areas that are of 
particular federal interest.176  Since one of the areas that requires the 
specialty and is of particular interest to federal courts is international law, 
the majority rejected Justice Scalia’s argument in his concurring opinion that 
federal courts cannot adopt new norms of evolving international law 
because they do not have common law-making authority.177  Nonetheless, 
the majority was still concerned that if it embraced an expansive 
interpretation of the ATS, federal courts would be encouraged to generate 
new general federal common law in their interpretation and application of 
newly evolved international law.178  This would run counter to the general 
practice of looking for “legislative guidance before exercising innovative
authority over substantive law.”179
Although Sosa did not altogether prohibit federal courts from 
generating new federal law based on evolving international norms, plaintiffs 
226; Organization of American States, American Convention on Human 
Rights, art. 7(3) July 18, 1978, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art. 6 (sOct. 21, 1986), OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5. 
171. Bassiouni, supra note 169, at 260-61 (stating that the prohibition
against arbitrary arrest is found in “at least 119 national constitutions”). 
172. See, e.g., Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir.
1998) (“There is a clear international prohibition against arbitrary arrest and 
detention.”); Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(identifying jus cogens norm against prolonged arbitrary detention); Comm. of 
U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(same); De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(stating that arbitrary detention violates the law of nations); Xuncax v. 
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184-85 (D. Mass. 1995). 
173. Sosa v. Alvarez-Manchain, 542 U.S. 692, 749 (2004).
174. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
175. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726.
176. Id. at 726.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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face a very heavy burden in trying to sue corporations under the ATS for 
violations of environmental norms or treaties.180  In determining which 
international norms are so fundamental that they deserve protection under 
the ATS, federal courts have only recognized a small category of norms 
prohibiting the most heinous human rights abuses, such as genocide, 
slavery, crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture.181  It is unlikely 
that federal courts will characterize the terrible environmental degradation 
that oil companies have perpetrated in the Niger Delta as akin to genocide 
or slavery, even though it arguably violates customary international law. 
Moreover, courts are less eager to apply the law of nations to private parties 
such as corporations because the law of nations usually imposes duties only 
upon nations.  
C. Suing Private Parties Under the ATS
Although the Executive and a powerful coalition of business interests 
urged the Court in Sosa to interpret the ATS so as to bar claims against 
corporations for violations of international law, the Court rejected this 
proposition.182  Instead, the Court explained that in determining whether a 
private actor could be liable under the ATS, the relevant inquiry “is related
[to] whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of 
a given norm to the perpetrator being sued.”183  Illustrating the difference
between private liability and state liability, the Court contrasted torture, 
which requires state action in order to be a violation of international law, 
with genocide which does not.184  Generally, private actors can only be liable 
before national courts for violations of jus cogens, or those “rules from which
no derogation is permissible.”185
Although most treaties and other sources of international law are 
primarily aimed at creating duties for states, the framers of First Judiciary 
180. James Boeving, Half Full . . . or Completely Empty?:  Environmental
Alien Tort Claims Post Sosa v. Alvarez-Manchain, 18 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 
109, 109 n.1 (2005).
181. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 762 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment) (observing that the subset of universally condemned behavior 
actionable under the ATS “includes torture, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.”).  Boeving, supra note 180, at 129 n.146 (noting 
“that the ATS cases that have survived motion to dismiss have involved 
serious human rights abuses, such as torture, slavery, or genocide . . .”).
182. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 721-22.
183. Id. at 733 n.20.
184. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
185. Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN  RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 225 (Henry J. Steiner and Philip 
Alston eds., 2000). 
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Act of 1789 were not solely concerned with providing a means of holding 
state actors accountable in U.S. courts when they enacted the ATS.  Private 
citizens who infringed the rights of ambassadors or diplomats could be sued 
under the ATS, and although pirates were not state actors there was never 
any question that their actions violated international law.186  Indeed, one of 
the earliest exercises of jurisdiction under the ATS involved an unlawful 
seizure of property by a non-state actor187 and the statute later provided 
jurisdiction over a child custody dispute allegedly involving a violation of 
the law of nations.188   
One of the cases most often cited for the proposition that the ATS 
covers violations of customary international law by private, non-state actors 
is Kadic v. Karadzic.189  This was a suit against Bosnian-Serb leader, Radovan 
Karadzic, for “genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in his
private capacity and for other violations in his capacity as a state actor.”190
The court based its conclusion that Karadzic could be held liable in his 
private capacity on the early use of the ATS against pirates, and then 
subsequently against slave traders and perpetrators of certain war crimes.191  
The court also relied on the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations of 
the United States, which states that “individuals may be held liable for
offenses against international law, such as piracy, war crimes, and 
genocide.”192  The more difficult question is determining when corporations
may be held liable under the ATS when their conduct falls outside this 
narrow category of crimes but still violates international law.  In this case 
plaintiffs must demonstrate that the corporation acted under “color of law”
or aided and abetted a state. 
i. ATS Color of Law Analysis
In determining whether a corporation’s conduct that falls outside the 
narrow category of wrongs is attributable to the action of a state, many U.S. 
courts have turned to the “color of law” jurisprudence adopted by U.S. courts
186. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720.
187. Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. C. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (stating that ATS
jurisdiction exists for French citizens’ restitution claim for seized slaves).
188. Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 862-63 (D. Md. 1961).
189. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239 (“We do not agree that the law of nations,
as understood in the modern era, confines its reach to state action. Instead, 
we hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether 
undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private 
individuals.”).
190. Id. at 236.
191. Id. at 239.
192. Id. at 240.
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under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.193  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court itself has 
acknowledged that these decisions “have not been a model of consistency.194
The Second Circuit usually has applied the 1983 “joint action” test to
determine whether private individuals may be held liable under the ATS.  In 
Kadic the court held that the proper inquiry for 1983 purposes is whether the 
defendant “acts together with state officials or with significant state aid.”195
Later, the court in Tachiona v. Mugabe relied upon Kadic to find that the ruling 
political party of Zimbabwe could be held liable for torture and terror 
because it had allegedly acted “in concert with Zimbabwe officials or with
significant assistance from state resources.”196  In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch/Shell the
court similarly found that in order for Shell to be liable for torture and 
summary execution perpetrated by the Nigerian military the plaintiffs had to 
demonstrate that Shell was a willful participant in a “joint action” with the
State or its agents that deprived the plaintiffs of their rights under 
customary international law.197  The court concluded that plaintiffs’ 
allegations in Wiwa that there was substantial cooperation between Shell 
and the Nigerian government in the commission of the alleged violations 
were sufficient to meet this test.198 
Courts in the Ninth Circuit have also applied the 1983 joint action test 
to determine whether there is state action for purposes of the ATS.  In Doe v. 
Unocal the California district court court concluded that the “joint action
test” was the appropriate test to determine whether the Unocal Corporation
could be held liable for international human rights violations that occurred 
during the construction of the Yadana natural gas pipeline project in 
Burma.199  The following year, however, the same court focused on the 
“proximate cause” test as well as the “joint action” test.200  The court did so
because it viewed the “joint action” test as appropriate only when the private
individual acted “in concert” with the government, while the “proximate
cause” test was appropriate when the government commits the violation on
its own and the private individual is implicated by proximately causing the 
government’s violation.201  However, the Ninth Circuit reversed these lower 
193. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245 (“The ‘color of law’ jurisprudence under 42
U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is a relevant guide to whether a defendant has engaged in 
official action for purposes of jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Act.”).
194. George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir.
1996) (citing Leebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995)).
195. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
196. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
197. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, No.
96 CIV 8386, at 39 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (internal quotations omitted). 
198. Id. at 43.
199. Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880, 890 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
200. Doe v. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1305-1307 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
201. Id.
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court decisions holding that “all torts alleged in the present action are jus
cogens violations and, thereby, violations of the law of nations” and therefore
a specific showing of state action was not required.202   
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto the California district court applied joint action and 
proximate cause tests to a claim that the government of Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) committed war crimes at the direction of defendant, Rio Tinto.203  The 
court explained that the joint action test applied when there was “action in
concert” with a government, whereas the proximate cause test applied when
there was “action by the private party exercising control over the
government.”204  The court concluded, however, that under either test the
allegations of war crimes committed by the state were “sufficient to state a
claim and confer jurisdiction under the [ATS].”205
In Beanal v. Freeport McMoRan, Inc. a group of Indonesian plaintiffs 
brought suit in a Louisiana district court against a mining company for 
genocide, various other human rights violations, and environmental torts.206  
The Beanal court applied the state action test as described in section 207 of 
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States207 
and the 1983 tests.208  Only after the facts failed to satisfy each of the tests 
did the court determine that there was no state action.209 
In Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Company, the New Jersey district court had to 
determine if Ford was a state actor because of its use of forced labor in Nazi 
Germany.210  The court concluded that the defendants were “de facto state
actors” because they “acted in close cooperation with Nazi officials in
compelling civilians to perform forced labor.”211  It would appear that the
Third Circuit found state action in Iwanowa based mostly on the facts and a 
loose combination of tests, and not the more formal state action analysis 
that other circuits have employed.  
ii. Aiding and Abetting State Action Analysis
The more recent ATS cases have generally applied aiding and abetting 
tests to determine whether there is state action.  In Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 
the plaintiffs alleged that Caterpillar aided and abetted the state of Israel by 
selling Israel bulldozers that were used to perpetrate human rights abuses 
202. Doe v. Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *29 (9th Cir. 2002).
203. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
204. Id. at 1146 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
205. Id. at 1149.
206. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997).
207. Id. at 374.
208. Id. at 377-380.
209. Id. at 380.
210. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Company, 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).
211. Id. at 445-46.
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against Palestinians.212  The Washington district court dismissed this claim, 
concluding that sellers cannot be held liable for selling a lawful, non-
defective product that they know will be used to commit a crime unless they 
have specific intent to further a buyer’s unlawful purpose.213  It also observed 
that a claim of conspiracy would fail for the same reason.214  The Ninth 
Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal on political question grounds.215  
Similarly, in In re South African Apartheid Litigation the plaintiffs alleged 
that the corporate defendants aided and abetted the apartheid government 
in South Africa in creating and profiting from deplorable labor conditions 
akin to prison-like conditions.216  The New York district court first noted the 
defendants could not be held liable for acting under color of law because 
they merely indirectly benefited from the unlawful practices of government 
and did not jointly act with it as Shell had in Wiwa.217  It then considered an 
aiding and abetting analysis but declined to apply it, concluding that there 
was not a universal international prohibition on aiding and abetting an 
unlawful regime.218  In dismissing the claim the court observed that it had to 
be “extremely cautious” in entertaining suits against corporations “doing
business in countries with less than stellar human rights records, especially 
since the consequences of such an approach could have significant, if not 
disastrous, effects on international commerce.”219
In Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., however, the New 
York district court found that aiding and abetting and conspiracy were 
universally recognized and sufficiently well defined in international 
jurisprudence to be applied under the ATS.220  The court found that the 
plaintiffs had pled sufficient facts to meet this test as they alleged Talisman 
worked with or encouraged Sudan to carry out acts of ethnic cleansing and 
provided material support to Sudan, knowing that it would be used to 
perpetrate ethnic cleansing.221  
In Bowoto v. Chevron, plaintiffs brought human rights claims in a 
California district court against Chevron for abuses in Nigeria and 
successfully argued that there was state action under three different 
212. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1026 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
213. Id. at 1027.
214. Id.
215. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007).
216. In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548-49
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 549-50.
219. Id. at 554.
220. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d
289, 320-324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
221. Id. at 324.
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theories, aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and agency.222  First, the court 
concluded that the plaintiffs had demonstrated sufficient evidence of aiding 
and abetting to establish state action, including evidence that Chevron 
personnel were directly involved in the attacks that formed the basis of the 
suit, transported the Nigerian military to the sites of the attacks, paid the 
Nigerian military, and knew that it was prone to use excessive force.223  
Second, the court concluded that same evidence was sufficient to establish 
a conspiracy between Chevron and the Nigerian government, which, under 
California law requires knowledge of a plan to engage in the specific 
wrongful conduct at issue and agreement to participate in that plan.224  
Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had produced sufficient 
evidence that Chevron could be held vicariously liable for the actions of the 
Nigerian military through a respondeat superior theory, the Nigerian military 
being the agent of Chevron.225  Under California law, a party seeking to 
establish actual agency must demonstrate (1) a manifestation by the 
principal that the agent shall act for him; (2) an acceptance by the agent of 
the undertaking; and (3) an understanding between the parties that the 
principal is to be in control of the undertaking.226  The court concluded that 
there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the Nigerian military was 
Chevron’s agent because the military was on Chevron’s payroll, engaged in 
extensive security work for Chevron, received food and clothing from 
Chevron, received the boats and helicopters it used in attacking civilians 
from Chevron, and was substantially controlled by Chevron in its operations 
in that Chevron led or supervised the military’s operations and had the 
power to discipline military personnel.227 
iii. State Action for Environmental Degradation in Nigeria
Nigerian plaintiffs asserting environmental claims under the ATS 
should be able to prove state action.  As has been previously discussed, the 
plaintiffs in Wiwa satisfied the joint action test by demonstrating that Shell 
cooperated with the state in depriving the plaintiffs of their human rights. 
Similarly, Nigerian plaintiffs alleging environmental claims should be able 
to demonstrate joint action with the state or its agents in the environmental 
destruction caused by oil extraction in the Niger Delta.  The Nigerian 
222. Bowoto supra note 2, at 17-22; see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 463-464 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (concluding that aiding and 
abetting and conspiracy were available under the ATS to hold Shell liable for 
human rights abuses committed by the Nigerian government in Ogoniland).
223. Bowoto supra note 2, at 18-19.
224. Id. at 19.
225. Id. at 22.
226. Id. at 19.
227. Id. at 19-21.
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government has joint ownership ventures with the oil companies in the 
Delta, derives most of its revenue from these operations, and purports to 
oversee and regulate the conduct of the oil companies but systematically 
fails to enforce its own environmental and regulatory law.  In particular, it 
has consistently failed to enforce its own moratoriums on gas flaring.  In this 
context of “rapacious company capitalism in which unaccountable foreign
transnationals are granted a sort of immunity by the state”228 for their
environmental degradations, the joint action test should be satisfied. 
Nigerian plaintiffs asserting environmental claims should also be able 
to satisfy the aiding and abetting tests.  In Bowoto the plaintiffs were able to 
sufficiently satisfy the aiding and abetting test to defeat defendants’ 
summary judgment motion by presenting evidence that Chevron personnel 
were directly involved in the attacks, transported the Nigerian military to the 
sites of the attacks, paid the Nigerian military, and knew that it was prone to 
use excessive force.  This evidence was also sufficient to satisfy the 
conspiracy and agency tests.  Nigerian plaintiffs asserting environmental 
claims should also be able to satisfy these tests because the Nigerian 
government is acting in even closer concert with the transnational oil 
companies in the extraction of oil itself than it is in the maintenance of 
security at the facilities where oil is extracted.  The systematic failure of the 
government to enforce the ban on gas flaring and the African Commission’s 
conclusion that the Nigerian government allowed the oil companies to 
devastate the environment of the Niger Delta would provide support for 
these theories of indirect liability.   
Although Nigerian plaintiffs would probably be able to satisfy the 
various color of law tests and the aiding and abetting tests, they may have 
difficulty avoiding the act of state doctrine.  The act of state doctrine is a 
domestic rule of comity that precludes U.S. courts from judging the official 
acts of another state performed within its own borders, especially when 
there is no clear international standard for the court to apply.229  While 
228. Watts, supra note 13, at 196.
229. See Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964):
If the act of state doctrine is a principle of decision binding on 
federal and state courts alike but compelled by neither 
international law nor the Constitution, its continuing vitality 
depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of 
functions between the judicial and political branches of the 
Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs. It should be 
apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus 
concerning a particular area of international law, the more 
appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, 
since the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed 
principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task 
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courts have generally declined to apply the act of state doctrine to violations 
of fundamental human rights on the ground that such norms are well-
defined and contemplate external scrutiny,230 they sometimes invoke the 
doctrine to avoid claims that are not sufficiently specific, well-defined, or 
universally adopted.231  Although this would suggest that claims specific 
enough to be actionable under the ATS would avoid the act of state 
doctrine, in Doe I v. Liu Qi the California district court determined that even if 
the claim were sufficiently specific to be actionable under the ATS, courts 
could decline to hear the case if the violation involved an act of state.232  
Moreover, the court determined that repression and human rights abuses 
committed by individual officials of the Chinese government that violated 
Chinese law could constitute acts of state if they were part of an unofficial 
policy of the state government.233  The court noted that it would more readily 
apply the act of state doctrine when an intrusive a remedy such as 
injunction was sought234 and when adjudicating the claim would conflict 
with the foreign relations of the political branches.235  The court ultimately 
declined to apply the act of state doctrine because declaratory relief was 
sought and because the State Department had condemned the practice.236  
The reasoning in Doe I presents a considerable obstacle to Nigerian 
plaintiffs asserting environmental claims under the ATS.  First, although the 
environmentally destructive practices of the oil companies are generally 
prohibited by Nigerian law, a court could readily conclude that by 
systematically failing to enforce these laws the government had an unofficial 
policy of engaging in environmental degradation and that it could not 
interfere with this act of the state.  Second, a court could decline to consider 
of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national 
interest or with international justice. It is also evident that some 
aspects of international law touch much more sharply on national 
nerves than do others; the less important the implications of an 
issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for 
exclusivity in the political branches. 
230. See, e.g., Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1431-34 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1058 (1990); Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 
1355, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1988). 
231. Nat’l Coalition Gov’t of Burma v. Unocal Corp., 176 F.R.D. 329, 353-357
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (act of state doctrine bars claims under ATS for 
expropriation of property, trespass, and conversion where no controlling 
international law but claims of torture and forced labor not barred).
232. Doe I v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
233. Id. at 1294.
234. Id. at 1301-02.
235. Id. at 1296.
236. Id. at 1306.
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a claim that sought an injunction on the operation of a fossil fuel project 
because that would unduly interfere with the sovereign choice of a state to 
pursue an environmentally destructive policy.  Third a court could decline to 
hear the case on the ground that it would interfere with the foreign policy of 
the political branches.  Thus, while Nigerian plaintiffs should be able to 
meet the color of law tests or the aiding and abetting test, they may not be 
able to overcome the act of state doctrine.  Moreover, even if they overcame 
the act of state of doctrine, as the following section demonstrates, they 
would have even greater difficulty convincing a court that these 
environmental harms were violations of customary international law 
judicially cognizable under the ATS. 
F. Environmental Claims Under the ATS
Although no ATS case asserting environmental harms has yet been 
fully heard on the merits, several plaintiffs have attempted to make a claim 
for violations of international environmental law.  While certain inter-
national environmental laws have probably come to be recognized as 
customary international law, they have yet to become specific, universal, 
and obligatory and likely will never become a “norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th century paradigms we have 
recognized”237 such that violations of them can be entertained by federal
courts.  As the following cases demonstrate, plaintiffs face a practically 
insurmountable barrier in convincing courts that certain environmental torts 
have been recognized under the narrow interpretation that customary 
international law has been given in ATS jurisprudence.  However, plaintiffs 
alleging transnational harm will have greater chances of succeeding. 
i. Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp.
The first time a court directly addressed an environmental claim under 
the ATS was in Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp.238  The English plaintiffs sued 
FMC under the ATS for fraudulently transporting to them copper residue 
from the U.S. that contained far more toxicity than promised in the 
contract.239  The plaintiffs argued that this fraudulent sale violated a U.S. 
environmental statute, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA),240 Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration,241 and the Third 
237. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719.
238. See Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
239. Id. at 761.
240. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (2000).
241. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-
16, 1972, Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
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Restatement on Foreign Relations.242  The New York district court dismissed 
the RCRA claim because there was insufficient evidence of legislative intent 
to apply the statute extraterritorially.243   
The Amlon court gave greater weight to the claims alleging violations of 
customary international law.  Principle 21 confers upon states the 
responsibility “to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction.”244  The Restatement further states that if the
activities have “caused significant injury” or risk of injury extraterritorially
“the state of origin is obligated to accord to the person injured or exposed to
such risk access to the same judicial or administrative remedies as are 
available in similar circumstances to persons within the state.”245  The court
held that the environmental claims were insufficient to establish a violation 
of international law because neither Principle 21 nor the Restatement 
reflected binding sources of international law.246  According to the court, the 
Principles of the Stockholm Declaration do not “set forth any specific
proscriptions, but rather refer only in a general sense to the responsibility of 
nations to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction do not cause 
damage to the environment beyond their borders.”247  Additionally, the
Restatement merely reflected American views on environmental law, but not 
“universally recognized principles of international law.”248  Amlon thus
suggests that before a norm can become actionable under the ATS, it must 
impose specific obligations on member nations and be universally adopted. 
ii. Aguinda v. Texaco
In Aguinda v. Texaco, Ecuadorian plaintiffs sued Texaco for severe long-
term environmental destruction, including intentional release of toxins into 
the environment, damage to pristine rainforests, and contamination of 
streams and aquifers.249  The plaintiffs alleged that Texaco destroyed their 
Environment, Principle 21, U.N. Doc A/CONF.48/14 (June 16, 1972) [hereinafter 
“Principle 21]. 
242. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 602(2) (1987)
[hereinafter “Restatement”].
243. Id. at 676.
244. Id.
245. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 602(2) (1987).
246. Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718 at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 11, 1994); see also Richard L. Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act:  A Practical Assessment, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 545, 547 (2000) 
(“Texaco dumped massive quantities of toxic byproducts onto roads and 
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property and upset the stability of Amazon basin habitats upon which they 
had traditionally subsisted.250  In a preliminary decision the court observed 
that under Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development states have “the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of 
other States or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”251  He then
suggested that Texaco’s actions could be actionable under the ATS “if there
were established misuse of hazardous waste of sufficient magnitude to 
amount to a violation of international law.”252  However, he cautioned that
“[n]ot all conduct which may be harmful to the environment, and not all
violations of environmental laws, constitute violations of the law of 
nations.253   
The case was ultimately dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens, 
international comity, and failure to join two indispensable parties – the 
Republic of Ecuador and its state owned oil company, Petroecuador.254  In 
dismissing the case, the judge explained that “plaintiff’s imaginative view of
this Court’s power must face the reality that United States districts courts 
are courts of limited jurisdiction” and that their power therefore “does not
include a general writ to right the world’s wrongs.”255  The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal on forum non conveniens because 
Texaco had not agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of 
Ecuador.256  After Texaco agreed to accept Ecuador’s jurisdiction, the district 
court on remand once again granted Texaco’s motion to dismiss on grounds 
of forum non conveniens.257  The Second Circuit then affirmed the decision to 
dismiss the case on grounds of forum non conveniens with a modification 
permitting the plaintiffs more time to re-file their actions in Ecuador.258  
Even though the case was dismissed on another ground, it is highly unlikely 
that the plaintiffs would have succeeded in holding Texaco liable on 
international environmental law grounds.  As Armin Rosencranz and Richard 
Campbell have observed, “lack of international consensus on environmental
norms is one reason why courts have been reluctant to recognize 
into streams and wetlands local people used for drinking, fishing and 
bathing. Texaco also filled over 600 pits with toxic waste, which often 
washed out in heavy rain.”) (citation omitted). 
250. Aguinda, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718 at 1-2.
251. Id. at 22.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 24.
254. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 627-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
255. Id. at 628.
256. Jota v. Texaco, 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
257. Aguinda v. Texaco, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
258. Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
  
West  Northwest, Vol. 15, No. 2, Sumer 2009 
409 
environmental abuses, absent accompanying human rights violations, as 
causes of action under the [ATS].”259
iii. Beanal v. Freeport McMoRan, Inc.
In the 1997 case of Beanal v. Freeport McMoRan, Inc., the Indonesian 
plaintiff sued Freeport under the ATS for torture, cultural genocide of his 
Amungme tribe, and environmental torts resulting from Freeport’s mining 
operations in Tamika, Irian Jaya, Indonesia.260  The Beanal plaintiffs relied on 
principles of international environmental law to support their environmental 
claims – namely, the Polluter Pays Principle, the Precautionary Principle, the 
Proximity Principle, Good Neighbor Principle, Principle 21, and Principle 2 of 
the Rio Declaration.261  The Beanal court held that violations of these 
principles “standing alone . . . do not constitute international torts for which
there is universal consensus in the international community as to their 
binding status and their content.”262  Finally, the court pointed out that the
principles apply to states, not “non-state corporations.”263 As the court had
already determined that there was no state action, even principles binding 
on states would have failed to provide a cause of action for the plaintiffs in 
Beanal. 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court to dismiss 
the complaint with prejudice.  It also expressed a greater hostility to 
environmental claims under the ATS than the district court had, observing 
that the “sources of international law cited by Beanal and the amici merely
refer to a general sense of environmental responsibility and state abstract 
rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable standards and 
regulations to identify practices that constitute international environmental 
abuses or torts.”264  The Fifth Circuit appeared to be particularly hostile to
the environmental claims in Beanal because the harm was only alleged to 
have occurred in one foreign country.  The court explained that “federal
courts should exercise extreme caution when adjudicating environmental 
claims . . . especially when the alleged environmental torts and abuses occur 
within the [foreign] sovereign’s borders and do not affect neighboring 
countries.”265  This suggests that the Fifth Circuit might not be so hostile to a
259. Armin Rosencranz and Richard Campbell, Foreign Environmental and
Human Rights Suits Against U.S. Corporations in U.S. Courts, 18 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 
145, 156 (1999).
260. Beanal, supra note 206.
261. Id. at 383-84.
262. Id. at 384 (citations omitted).
263. Id.
264. Beanal v. Freeport McMoRan, 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999).
265. Id.
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claim alleging that environmental harms had significant trans-boundary 
effects such as those caused by global warming. 
iv. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corporation
In Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corporation, eight Peruvian citizens 
brought suit against the Southern Peru Copper Corporation alleging that its 
copper mining, refining, and smelting operations in and around Ilo, Peru 
caused environmental pollution resulting in their asthma and lung disease, 
which “violated their rights to life, health, and sustainable development.”266
The plaintiffs attempted to distinguish their case from Amlon, Aguinda, and 
Beanal by characterizing their claims as based on human rights law rather 
than environmental law.267  They did so by arguing that the defendant’s 
release of large amounts of pollution into the air that caused plaintiffs’ or 
their decedents’ severe lung disease violated “their right to life” and
“sustainable development” under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.268  The New York 
district court judge was unimpressed with this novel argument, asserting 
that “the labels plaintiffs affix to their claims cannot be determinative.”269
The court dismissed the claim because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate 
“that high levels of environmental pollution, causing harm to human life,
health, and sustainable development within a nation’s borders, violate any 
well-established rules of customary international law.”270
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, 
observing that the rights the plaintiffs claimed Southern Peru Copper 
Corporation violated were “boundless and indeterminate” and that the
statements of the international human rights instruments they relied upon 
merely expressed “virtuous goals understandably expressed at a level of
abstraction needed to secure the adherence of States that disagree on many 
of the particulars regarding how actually to achieve them.”271  The Second
Circuit held that such “vague” statements do not establish customary
international law cognizable under the ATS.272  It also rejected the plaintiffs’ 
claim that “egregious” intra-national pollution violated customary
266. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper, 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
267. Id. at 519-520.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 519.
270. Id. at 525 (citation omitted).
271. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper, 343 F.3d 140, 161 (2d Cir. 2003).
272. Id. at 165.
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international law because intra-national pollution is the concern of that 
nation alone and not of “mutual concern” to the international community.273
The analysis in Flores demonstrates that plaintiffs alleging that merely 
intra-national pollution is a violation of customary international law 
actionable under the ATS will not succeed.  Plaintiffs should therefore assert 
that the pollution had significant trans-boundary effects such that it is of 
“mutual concern” to the international community.  Plaintiffs would still have
to convince courts that there are specific enforceable standards for trans-
boundary pollution “comparable to the features of the 18th century
paradigms” of ATS litigation such as offenses against ambassadors and
piracy. 
v. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC
In Sarei, residents of the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea 
brought claims in a California district court against the British mining 
company Rio Tinto PLC and the Australian corporation Rio Tinto Limited for 
human rights and environmental torts connected with the defendants’ 
mining operations.274  The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants dumped 
mine tailings into the Kawerong-Jaba river system, causing the destruction 
of the river valley and thousands of acres of rainforests, the pollution of the 
local bay and the death of the fish upon which the local population 
subsisted.275  The plaintiffs also alleged that defendants released large 
amounts of air pollution, causing respiratory infections and asthma among 
the local population.276 
First, the plaintiffs claimed that these environmental harms violated 
the “right to life” and the “right to health” recognized in international law.  In
arguing that there is a human right to environmental protection, the 
plaintiffs relied on statements by an international law expert,277 who had 
relied upon international and regional human rights conventions.278  The 
273. See id. at 159-60 (rejecting plaintiffs’ standard in part because it
“would shift the subject matter of customary international law from matters 
of mutual concern between States – between States in their relations ‘inter 
se’ – to any matter in respect of which ‘egregious’ conduct could occur”). 
274. Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116.
275. Id. at 1122-24.
276. Id. at 1125.
277. See id. at 1156.  The plaintiffs relied heavily on the declaration of
Professor Gunther Handl.
278. See id. Handl cited the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the American Convention on 
Human Rights, the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
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plaintiffs also relied on an Inter-American Commission report which 
concluded that “[c]onditions of severe environmental pollution, which may
cause serious physical illness, impairment and suffering on the part of the 
local populace, are inconsistent with the right to be respected as a human 
being.”279  Additionally, the plaintiffs cited the Gabcikovo Dam Case,280 where
the International Court of Justice held that environmental protection is “a
vital part of contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for 
numerous human rights such as the right to health and the right to life 
itself.”281  The Sarei court rejected this claim, holding that neither the right to
life nor the right to health was universal, definable and obligatory.282 
The plaintiffs’ second claim alleged that the environmental harm they 
suffered violated the international norm of sustainable development, which 
requires states to avoid serious and irreversible environmental or health 
effects.283  The court dismissed this claim because the principle of 
sustainable development was far too broad to be actionable under the 
ATS.284  The court observed that even the plaintiffs’ expert could not delimit 
that “right.”285
The plaintiffs’ third claim was based on United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”)286 which requires states to take “all
measures . . . necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
marine environment that involves hazards to human health, living resources 
and marine life through the introduction of substances into the marine 
environment” and to “adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and
control pollution of the marine environment caused by land-based 
sources.287  The court found that “plaintiffs have adequately stated a claim
for violation of the customary international law reflected in UNCLOS.”288  It
did so in part because UNCLOS had been ratified by 166 nations.289  The 
defendants allegedly violated the Convention by polluting a major bay in 
which an estimated 8,000 hectares were covered with “tailings to a copper
concentration greater than 500ppm (parts per million),” causing the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
279. Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
280. See Gabcikovo Dam Case, supra note 162.
281. Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1156-57 (citation omitted).
282. Id. at 1158.
283. Id. at 1160.
284. Id. at 1161.
285. Id. at 1160-61.
286. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,
U.N.T.S. 397.
287. Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (citation omitted).
288. Id. at 1163.
289. Id. at 1161.
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destruction of the local fish upon which the population subsisted, and the 
pollution of the Pacific Ocean itself.290  
Although the court found the UNCLOS claim to be actionable under 
the ATS based on customary international law, it dismissed the claim based 
on the act of state doctrine because the defendants’ mining activities were 
undertaken pursuant to an agreement with the government of Papua New 
Guinea which constituted the acts of a foreign sovereign.291  The court 
invoked international comity292 and the political question doctrine as 
additional justifications for dismissing the claim.293 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that 
UNCLOS claim constituted customary international law, even in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa.294  It reversed the district court’s dismissal of 
all the claims as being nonjusticiable political questions because the Ninth 
Circuit did not foresee any sufficiently adverse political consequences that 
would arise from litigating the case, despite the State Department’s Statement 
of Interest (hereinafter “SOI”) which argued that the court should dismiss the
case.295  The Ninth Circuit also vacated the district court’s dismissal of the 
UNCLOS claim on act of state grounds because the district court had relied 
too heavily on the State Department’s SOI in dismissing the case.296  
Additionally the court vacated the lower court’s comity findings so that the 
district court could reconsider it without over-relying upon the SOI and so that 
it could reconsider the government of Papua New Guinea’s opposition to the 
suit in light of new evidence that the new government actually wanted to see 
the case proceed to litigation.297  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
conclusion that the plaintiffs did not have to exhaust local remedies in Papua 
New Guinea before bringing suit under the ATS in U.S. courts, even though 
international law requires exhaustion.298 
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit vacated its decision in response to the 
defendant’s motion arguing that the decision should be reconsidered and 
the prior decision therefore has no precedential value.299  Nonetheless, the 
conclusion of both the district court and the Ninth Circuit that UNCLOS is 
customary international law actionable under the ATS is a significant victory 
for international plaintiffs, especially as it is the only environmental law that 
U.S. courts have found to be part of customary international law.  The 
290. Id. at 1162 (citation omitted).
291. Id. at 1185-88.
292. Id. at 1201-1208.
293. Id. at 1198.
294. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 456 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2006).
295. Id. at 1082.
296. Id. at 1086.
297. Id. at 1088.
298. Id. at 1089.
299. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007).
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plaintiffs’ ultimate success on the UNCLOS claim would have depended on 
environmental science proving that the contamination of waters off 
Bougainville extended into “open sea” territory under UNCLOS, and also on a
finding of state action.  The harm caused by the defendants would therefore 
have to extend beyond the territorial borders of Papua New Guinea and affect 
the interests of other nations.  Sarei thus gives further credence to the 
reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Beanal, and of the district court and Second 
Circuit in Flores, that environmental harm does not become of great enough 
concern to the international community to be cognizable under the ATS until 
its effects are felt across boundaries and not confined to just one nation.  
G. Nigerian Environmental Claims Under the ATS
As the foregoing cases demonstrate, courts have refused to recognize 
that the degradation of a foreign environment constitutes a violation of 
customary international law when that degradation is confined to one 
nation.  While it is not clear that transnational environmental harm would 
constitute a violation of customary international law, the courts in Flores and 
Beanal indicated that they might change their analysis if transnational 
environmental harm were alleged.  Moreover, in Sarei the allegation that the 
mining operations polluted the Pacific Ocean – part of the high seas – might 
have impelled the Ninth Circuit to affirm the district court’s conclusion that 
UNCLOS was part of customary international law had it not vacated the 
prior decision on other grounds. 
U.S. courts are understandably reluctant to apply customary 
international law norms to claims of environmental harm that are confined 
to one nation.  This is because conservative justifications of international 
law hold that it should only regulate activities that affect the international 
community.  According to John O. McGinnis and Ilya Somin, an international 
legal regime is necessary in an increasingly interconnected and 
interpenetrated world to protect nations from the potentially harmful effect 
of actions taken by other nations, just as the New Deal was necessary to 
protect states from the potentially harmful effects of the actions of other 
states.300  The scope of such a regime depends on the extent of the external 
effects it is meant to regulate.301  Accordingly, “local government should
address only local matters, state governments should address only matters 
300. John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Global Constitutionalism:  Global
Influence on U.S. Jurisprudence:  Should International Law Be Part of Our Law? 59 
Stan. L. Rev. 1175, 1183 (2007). 
301. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the
Matching Principle:  The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority,  
14 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 23, 24 (1996) (observing that the size of a 
government’s jurisdiction is proportionate to the extent of the spillovers it is 
designed to regulate).
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that affect the state’s residents, and the federal government should address 
issues that affect multiple states.”302  By this reasoning, international law
should only regulate international matters – those “activities within nations
that impose substantial costs or benefits outside those nations’ borders.”303
Since states have little incentive to regulate activities that impose diffuse 
external burdens throughout the world, an international regime is necessary 
to regulate these activities.304  For example, an international regime is 
needed to regulate the economic activities that cause global warming 
because the effects of global warming are largely externalized and national 
governments therefore have little incentive to regulate them.305  Similarly, 
activities that impose burdens on the use of the high seas, which UNCLOS 
undertakes to regulate, are largely externalized and therefore must be 
regulated internationally. 
International instruments that regulate activities that have substantial 
transboundary effects should be distinguished from those that regulate 
purely internal matters such as international human rights instruments.306  
The rise of international human rights law is largely justified by a western 
liberal view that human rights are universal307 – that there are certain rights 
that are self-evident truths that know no national boundaries.308  Courts 
might be concerned that if they were to find such rights to be customary 
302. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 300, at 1183.  See also Butler &
Macey, supra note 301, at 26.
303. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 300, at 1183.  See also Eric A. Posner &
Alan O. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum, 93 Geo. L.J. 993, 1013 (2005) (“The 
conventional justification for public international law is the existence of 
important international externalities when decisions are made unilaterally.”).
304. See Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties,
35 Va. Int’l L. 121, 122, 174-175 (arguing that an international regime is needed 
to regulate activities that have widespread international effects).
305. See Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect
the Global Environment, 83 Geo. L.J. 2131, 2146 (1995) (observing that no single 
nation has great enough incentives to address global warming alone). 
306. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes:  Democratic
Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 Int’l Org. 217, 217 (2000) (“International human 
rights institutions are not designed primarily to regulate policy externalities 
arising from societal interactions across borders, but to hold governments 
accountable for purely internal activities.”).
307. See JURGEN HABERMAS, KANT’S IDEA OF PERPETUAL PEACE, WITH THE
BENEFIT OF TWO HUNDRED YEARS’ HINDSIGHT, IN PERPETUAL PEACE:  ESSAYS ON
KANT’S COSMOPOLITAN IDEAL 113 (James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bachmann 
eds., 1997) (arguing that international law stems from Kantian universalism).
308. See Costas Douzinas, The End(s) of Human Rights, 26 Melb. U. L. Rev.
445, 451 (2002) (“International human rights are the most common form of 
universal morality . . . .”).
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international law, they would be imposing western values upon other 
nations and infringing upon their sovereignty.  The requirement of ATS 
jurisprudence that international norms be universal and sufficiently specific 
probably stems from this concern.  Once a norm becomes universally 
recognized and sufficiently specific, all states will have recognized and 
adopted it.  However, the concern about infringement upon the sovereign 
jurisdiction of another nation is unwarranted when the activities forming the 
basis of the suit have substantial transnational effects – in other words, they 
cannot be said to be purely domestic matters that U.S. courts should refrain 
from interfering with.  Moreover, courts should be less willing to dismiss 
international environmental instruments as being merely aspirational when 
there is transnational harm alleged because in such cases the international 
community has a great incentive to have binding international rules. 
Since the regulation of transnational environmental harm caused by 
U.S. corporations could be justified by economics309 and would be less likely 
to interfere with another nation’s sovereign jurisdiction than regulation of 
human rights310 Nigerian plaintiffs bringing suit against U.S. corporations 
under the ATS should allege transnational environmental harm.  Nigerian 
plaintiffs could allege that the massive and continuous oil spills and leaks 
that are allowed by the U.S. oil companies operating in the Niger Delta have 
transnational effects, namely the pollution of the high seas.  They could 
allege that this violates UNCLOS.  Although the conclusion of the district 
court and the Ninth Circuit in Sarei that UNCLOS constitutes customary 
international law has no precedential value, the plaintiffs might rely upon 
the reasoning of these courts.  However, a court carefully following the 
dictates of Sosa is unlikely to conclude that the norms contained in UNCLOS 
have features as specific as the 18th century ATS paradigms the Supreme 
309. See, e.g., Butler & Macey, supra,, note 301, at 24.
310. Admantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, Human Rights: A Western
Construct with Limited Applicability, in HUMAN RIGHTS – CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 9 (A. Pollis and P. Schwab eds., 1979) (arguing that purportedly 
“universal” human rights are derived from exclusively western values); see also 
Francis A. Boyle, FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORDER: THE LEGALIST APPROACH TO
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1898-1921) 24 (1999) (“All the major actors except 
Japan shared a cultural heritage schooled in the Old Testament, Greece, 
Rome, medieval Christendom, the Renaissance, the industrial revolution 
and Nepoleonic Wars, and the tradition of a ‘concert’ of European powers 
determining matters of world politics by mutual consent and negotiated 
agreement throughout the nineteenth century.”); Mohammed Bedjaoui, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PROSPECTS 9 (1991) (“the actual body of international 
law, as it stands today, is not only the product of the conscious activity of 
the European mind, but had drawn its vital essence from a common source 
of European beliefs, and in both these aspects is mainly of Western 
European origin.”). 
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Court identified, such as offenses against ambassadors or piracy.  Since the 
Supreme Court has not yet delineated the specific features of those 
offenses, a sympathetic court might find that UNCLOS is customary 
international law.  Plaintiffs could argue that pollution of the high seas is 
analogous to piracy, an 18th century paradigm of ATS litigation, as both 
harms could not effectively be regulated unilaterally and both harms are of 
concern to the international community as a whole.  
Nigerian plaintiffs would also need to support their UNCLOS claim 
with specific scientific evidence.  It would seem that 40 years of continuous 
oil extraction and refining in the Niger Delta with little to no concern for 
environmental harm would have had significant harmful effects on the 
Atlantic Ocean and that these effects would be relatively easy to ascertain.  If 
it could be proven that the fishing grounds of neighboring countries were 
harmed by oil spillage and leakage in the Niger Delta, a violation of 
UNCLOS might be established that was actionable under the ATS.311  
However, even though ownership of the oilfields in Nigeria is divided 
geographically into separate fiefdoms,312 it would be considerably difficult to 
prove that a particular company was responsible for the harm. 
Nigerian plaintiffs could also assert that the effects of gas flaring are 
transnational.  First, they could assert that the flaring causes acid rain and 
pollution of the air of surrounding countries.  If they could establish health 
problems and harm to the infrastructure of neighboring countries, it is at 
least possible that plaintiffs might succeed in convincing a court that gas 
flaring violates customary international law.  Nonetheless, causation would 
be very difficult to establish.  If transnational illness and death were 
correlated to the flaring in general, it would still be difficult to establish 
which oil company in particular was responsible, so suit would probably 
need to be brought against all of them.  Acid rain in Nigeria can easily be 
traced to the flaring313 but the rain in other countries might not be 
sufficiently acidic to establish that oil companies were responsible.  Even 
with substantial funds, establishing large-scale transnational environmental 
harm would be difficult. 
Second, plaintiffs could assert gas flaring contributes significantly to 
global warming and therefore implicates rights that are held globally.  There 
is an increasing international consensus that global warming must be 
addressed and given that associated gas flaring has been outlawed or 
severely curtailed in nearly every nation,314 Nigerian plaintiffs could argue 
that the widespread flaring of associated gas in Nigeria violates an 
international norm.  However, they would be unlikely to convince U.S. courts 
311. See Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161.
312. Watts, supra note 13, at 196.
313. Akpan, supa note 30, at 47-52.
314. Watts, supra note 13, at 195-196.
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gas flaring violates customary international law, because it does not have 
specificity comparable to the 18th century ATS paradigms such as offenses 
against ambassadors and piracy.  The international community has not 
agreed upon what specific measures states must take to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and most states probably prohibit gas flaring because it is in 
their self-interest not because they feel obligated to.  Even if gas flaring were 
found to violate a norm of customary international law, causation would be 
very difficult to establish because though the amount of fossil fuels emitted 
can because their precise effect cannot.  
H. Human Rights Claims as a Proxy for Environmental Claims under
the ATS
As has been demonstrated above, the environmental degradation in 
Nigeria committed by transnational oil companies is intimately connected 
to the human rights abuses committed by the Nigerian military, usually 
acting at the behest of the oil companies.  It would appear logical then for 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring suit under the ATS for these human rights abuses 
and hope that by carefully constructing the complaint they might also 
encompass the environmental degradation.  This would appear particularly 
attractive because the environmental destruction itself – the cause of the 
human rights abuses – is unlikely to be considered customary international 
law by a court.  Bridgeman has argued that since U.S. courts have failed to 
incorporate environmental norms as part of the law of nations, “plaintiffs’
attorneys should focus on the remedies available for human rights 
violations under the [ATS].”315  Thus in a case “where there are both human
rights and environmental claims, as frequently occurs, the plaintiffs should 
focus on shaping the remedies around the human rights claims so that if the 
environmental claims are dismissed, there is still some redress of the 
environmental harm.”316  As monetary relief for human rights abuses may be
inadequate when the human rights violations stem “from a complex source
such as suppression of dissent regarding a development project,” plaintiffs’
lawyers should seek an injunction of the underlying development project.317  
Such an injunction would eliminate the cause of the human rights abuses 
and the environmental destruction. 
Unfortunately, an injunction is a difficult remedy to obtain and a court 
would be unlikely to enjoin a fossil fuel project in Nigeria unless it found 
that the environmental destruction caused by the project was a violation of 
the law of nations actionable under the ATS.  If that were the case, an 
injunction could be obtained solely on the basis of environmental claims 
315. Bridgeman, supra note 86, at 35.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 37.
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and it would be unnecessary to bring the human rights claims as a proxy for 
environmental claims.  To obtain an injunction in the Ninth Circuit the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers would have to demonstrate “irreparable harm and
inadequacy of legal remedies.”318  In Nigeria the irreparable harm caused by
the oil companies should be fairly easy to demonstrate as the damage is 
severe and lasting.  The inadequacy of legal remedies should also be 
relatively easy to demonstrate because money damages – the legal remedy – 
would not halt the enormously destructive practices of the oil companies. 
However, plaintiffs would first have to show a violation of customary 
international law. 
Since environmental norms are unlikely to be recognized by courts as 
part of the law of nations, the possibility of obtaining an order enjoining a 
fossil fuel project is unlikely.  While a court might conclude that the human 
rights violations that stem from the environmental destruction are 
actionable under the ATS, the cause of the environmental destruction would 
not be enjoined on that basis.  In that event, the human rights abuses 
themselves could be remedied without a court ever having to address the 
environmental harms.  For example, plaintiffs might be able to obtain 
monetary for relief for human rights abuses committed by security forces 
without ever having environmental degradation remedied.  Indeed, the oil 
companies could even continue to commit human rights abuses to 
discourage protests so long as they did not rise to the level of customary 
international law violations actionable under the ATS.  Plaintiffs should 
therefore combine their human rights claims with environmental claims and 
seek an injunction on the fossil fuel projects which are the cause of both 
human rights abuses and environmental destruction.  As has been 
demonstrated above, the allegation of transnational harm is perhaps the 
best way to convince a court that an environmental norm is part of the law 
of nations. 
VI. Conclusion
Since the Nigerian courts and the African Commission have failed to 
remedy or halt the environmental devastation caused by oil companies 
operating in Nigeria, it would appear logical for plaintiffs to take advantage 
of the relatively liberal jurisdiction of U.S. courts. As has been 
demonstrated, however, U.S. courts have created practically insurmountable 
barriers to environmental claims brought by or on behalf of foreigners. 
While such claims are very unlikely to succeed, even if cleverly pled, the 
most likely way for plaintiffs to prevail would be for them to allege 
transnational harm.  As to U.S. NEPA and Section 7 of ESA, plaintiffs might 
318. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm’n v. National Football League, 634
F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980).
  
West  Northwest, Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 2009 
420 
be able to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality if they 
alleged harm to domestic U.S. interests.  Plaintiffs bringing suit under the 
ATS would do best to assert transnational harm, particularly harm to the 
high seas in violation of UNCLOS.  The very fact that the numerous and well-
funded plaintiffs’ firms involved in international environmental and human 
rights litigation have refrained from filing such suits, however, indicates that 
even allegations of transnational environmental harm are unlikely to survive 
motions for summary judgment.  Given the failure of any regulatory body or 
court to place any real limits on the oil companies’ activities in the delta, it 
is not surprising that the Nigerian people continue to resort to protest, 
extortion, kidnapping, and sabotage. 
